Copyright 2013 by Northwestern University School of Law
Northwestern University Law Review

Printed in U.S.A.
Vol. 107, No. 3

AN FDA FOR FINANCIAL INNOVATION:
APPLYING THE INSURABLE INTEREST
DOCTRINE TO TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY
FINANCIAL MARKETS
Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl
ABSTRACT—The financial crisis of 2008 was caused in part by speculative
investment in complex derivatives. In enacting the Dodd–Frank Act,
Congress sought to address the problem of speculative investment, but it
merely transferred that authority to various agencies, which have not yet
found a solution. We propose that when firms invent new financial
products, they be forbidden to sell them until they receive approval from a
government agency designed along the lines of the FDA, which screens
pharmaceutical innovations. The agency would approve financial products
if they satisfy a test for social utility that focuses on whether the product
will likely be used more often for insurance than for gambling. Other
factors—such as a financial product’s effect on the efficient allocation of
capital—may be addressed if the answer is ambiguous. This approach
would revive and make quantitatively precise the common law insurable
interest doctrine, which helped control financial gambling before
deregulation in the 1990s.
AUTHORS—Eric A. Posner is Kirkland & Ellis Distinguished Service
Professor and Aaron Director Research Scholar, University of Chicago
Law School; E. Glen Weyl is Assistant Professor, Department of
Economics, University of Chicago, and Fellow, Toulouse School of
Economics. Posner acknowledges the financial support of the Russell
Baker Scholars Fund at the University of Chicago Law School; Weyl
acknowledges the support of the Institut D’Économie Industrielle. Thanks
to Omri Ben-Shahar, John Bogle, Anthony Casey, Steve Choi, Darrell
Duffie, Todd Henderson, William Hubbard, Adam Levitin, Thomas
Philippon, Andrew Rosenfield, Jean Tirole, David Weisbach, and seminar
participants at the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the Federal
Trade Commission, the University of Chicago Law School, and the
Chicago Booth School of Business for comments. Thanks to Alison Lanski,
Ellie Norton, Michael Olijnyk, and Anthony Zhang for research assistance.
An early and much shorter version of this paper circulated as a white paper
under the name A Proposal for Limiting Speculation on Derivatives: An
FDA for Financial Innovation and is available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1995077.
1307

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 1308
I.

II.

BENEFITS AND HARMS OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION ............................................. 1313
A.

Financial Markets and Social Welfare ..................................................... 1313

B.

Tests for Evaluating Financial Innovation ............................................... 1322

C.

Examples................................................................................................... 1328

D.

Relationship with the Insurable Interest Rule and the Law
Against Wagering ..................................................................................... 1344

AN FDA FOR THE FINANCIAL MARKET ............................................................... 1348
A.

Structure of the Financial Products Agency ............................................. 1348

B.

Parallels Between Pharmaceutical and Financial Products Regulation .. 1349

C.

Criticisms and Qualifications ................................................................... 1351

CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 1357

Derivatives are financial weapons of mass destruction.
—Warren Buffett

†

INTRODUCTION
Financial products are socially beneficial when they help people insure
risks, but when these same products are used for gambling they can instead
be socially detrimental.1 The difference between insurance and gambling is
that insurance enables people to reduce the risk they face, whereas
gambling increases it. A person who purchases financial products to insure
herself essentially pays someone else to take a risk on her behalf. The
counterparty may be better able to absorb the risk, typically because she
has a more diversified investment portfolio or owns assets whose value is
inversely correlated with the risk taken on. By contrast, when a person
gambles, that person exposes herself to increased net risk without offsetting
a risk faced by a counterparty: she merely gambles in hopes of gaining at
the expense of her counterparty or her counterparty’s regulator. To be sure,
a person on one side of the transaction may be gambling while the person
on the other side of the transaction may be insuring; then the question is
whether the transaction on net reduces risks, increases them, or has no
effect. In general, when we refer to insuring and gambling, we mean these
† Buffett Warns on Investment “Time Bomb,” BBC (Mar. 4, 2003, 1:32 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/2817995.stm.
1
As we discuss below, new financial products also have other harms (informational racing) and
benefits (information and incentive provision), but we believe that for most new products the
insurance–gambling tradeoff is most important. In previous drafts and in parts of the literature, what we
call “insurance” is referred to as “hedging” and what we call “gambling” is referred to as “speculation”
or “betting.” These terms are essentially equivalent, but we refer to insurance and gambling as they
make the nature of the activity clearest to the broadest audience.
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net effects rather than the position on one side of the transaction. As we
discuss below, gambling may have some ancillary benefits in improving
the information in market prices. However, it is overwhelmingly a
negative-sum activity, which, in the aggregate, harms the people who
engage in it, and which can also produce negative third-party effects by
increasing systemic risk in the economy.
This basic point has long been recognized,2 but has had little influence
on modern discussions of financial regulation. Before the 2008 financial
crisis, the academic and political consensus was that financial markets
should be deregulated.3 This consensus probably rested on pragmatic rather
than theoretical considerations: the U.S. economy had grown enormously
from 1980 to 2007, and this growth had taken place at the same time as,
and seemed to be connected with, the booming financial sector, which was
characterized by highly innovative financial practices. With the 2008
financial crisis, this consensus came to an end, and since then there has
been a significant retrenchment, epitomized by the passage of the Dodd–
Frank Act,4 which authorizes regulatory agencies to impose significant new
regulations on the financial industry.
But the Dodd–Frank Act is an empty vessel: it authorizes agencies to
regulate without giving them much guidance as to how to regulate.5 So
numerous questions remain open as to how the agencies should use their
authority, and indeed whether the Dodd–Frank Act creates the proper
regulatory structure.
In this Article, we propose a new approach to financial regulation that
addresses the problem of financial gambling. We make two contributions.
First, we propose a simple test for determining whether a financial
instrument is socially valuable or socially costly, and argue that socially
costly financial instruments should be banned. This argument is made in
Part I. Second, we propose ex ante regulation of the market in financial
derivatives,6 where financial innovators must submit proposed new
2

In the economics literature, the idea was first formalized by Jack Hirshleifer and, in a form closer
to that we consider, by Itzhak Gilboa, Dov Samet, and David Schmeidler. See Jack Hirshleifer, The
Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 561
(1971); Itzhak Gilboa et al., Utilitarian Aggregation of Beliefs and Tastes, 112 J. POL. ECON. 932
(2004). However, the underlying idea is quite old, and can be found, for example, in debates about
gambling and insurance in eighteenth-century Britain. See infra notes 62–63 and accompanying text.
3
GILLIAN TETT, FOOL’S GOLD: HOW THE BOLD DREAM OF A SMALL TRIBE AT J.P. MORGAN WAS
CORRUPTED BY WALL STREET GREED AND UNLEASHED A CATASTROPHE 34−35 (2009).
4
Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat.
1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12, 15, 22, and 26 U.S.C.).
5
See, e.g., DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD–FRANK ACT
AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES (2011); Saule T. Omarova, License to Deal: Mandatory
Approval of Complex Financial Products, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 63, 77–78 (2012).
6
We use the term “derivatives” loosely to refer to a class of financial instruments whose value is
derived from underlying assets, with a focus on recent financial innovations. The proper definition of
derivatives is in dispute, and commentators and courts typically refer to a specific group of products
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financial products to the government for approval before they may sell
them to the public. We will refer to this agency as the Financial Products
Agency (FPA), although we are agnostic as to whether a new agency
should be created or existing agencies, such as the SEC or CFTC, should be
given these powers.7 We draw on the analogy of the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), which similarly has the power to ban new
pharmaceuticals that do not meet stringent safety standards. This argument
is made in Part II.
We do not write on a clean slate. Criticism of gambling goes back
centuries,8 and the basic welfare-reducing implications of this practice have
long been recognized. We also rely on some recent economic literature that
provides technical explanations as to how one can distinguish between
value-reducing gambling and value-increasing insurance.9 In addition,
numerous legal scholars have addressed how the government should
regulate the financial markets.10 Most of the literature focuses on traditional
(for example, options and swaps), although the term may encompass many other products such as
insurance policies. For a useful discussion, see Timothy E. Lynch, Derivatives: A Twenty-First Century
Understanding, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 15–30 (2011).
7
After we circulated a draft of this paper on SSRN, we learned about a then-unpublished draft that
independently proposes an FDA-like approach to financial regulation. See Omarova, supra note 5.
Readers should consult this paper, as well. Our proposal also builds off an earlier unpublished draft and
published op-ed piece written by one of us. See E. Glen Weyl, Is Arbitrage Socially Beneficial? (Oct.
2007) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter Weyl manuscript], available at http://home.uchicago.edu/
weyl/Second_Draft_Arbitrage.pdf; Glen Weyl, Op-Ed., Financial Guidance from FDA, BOS. GLOBE,
Dec. 3, 2008, at A19. Other related papers outside the law review literature include JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ,
COMM’N OF EXPERTS OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UN GEN. ASSEMBLY ON REFORMS OF THE INT’L
MONETARY & FIN. SYS., PRINCIPLES FOR A NEW FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE, available at http://www.
un.org/ga/president/63/commission/newfinancialarchitecture.pdf; Sumit Agarwal et al., The Age of
Reason: Financial Decisions over the Life Cycle and Implications for Regulation, BROOKINGS PAPERS
ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Fall 2009, at 51; Gerald Epstein & James Crotty, Controlling Dangerous
Financial Products Through a Financial Pre-Cautionary Principle, 72 EKONOMIAZ 270 (2009)
(advocating ex ante regulation of financial products on the basis of a precautionary principle); and
James Crotty & Gerald Epstein, A Financial Precautionary Principle: New Rules for Financial Product
Safety (Wall St. Watch, Working Paper No. 1, 2009). These papers address issues beyond the scope of
our Article and do not provide the same test that we propose.
8
See, e.g., GEOFFREY CLARK, BETTING ON LIVES: THE CULTURE OF LIFE INSURANCE IN ENGLAND,
1695−1775 (1999).
9
Stefano G. Athanasoulis & Robert J. Shiller, World Income Components: Measuring and
Exploiting Risk-Sharing Opportunities, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 1031 (2001); Alp Simsek, Speculation and
Risk Sharing with New Financial Assets (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17,506,
2011); Markus K. Brunnermeier et al., A Welfare Criterion for Models with Distorted Beliefs (Feb.
2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2021600.
10
See Erik F. Gerding, Credit Derivatives, Leverage, and Financial Regulation’s Missing
Macroeconomic Dimension, 8 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 29, 37−38 (2011) (making a similar argument). For
other related work in the legal literature, see Robert S. Bloink, Does the Dodd–Frank Wall Street
Reform Act Rein In Credit Default Swaps? An EU Comparative Analysis, 89 NEB. L. REV. 587, 632−33
(2011) (expressing cautious skepticism about regulation because of the benefits of financial products);
Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based Proposal, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 279,
333−34 (2000) (proposing market-based regulation of securities markets); Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the
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methods of financial regulation, such as disclosure requirements,11 and
recently, the special need for financial regulation to protect consumers.12
We do not address either of these topics: although some of our comments
on heuristic arbitrage are related to consumer protection, our concern is the
overall health of the financial markets, and our proposal would apply both
to inexperienced and sophisticated investors. Only a few legal scholars
have focused on the problem of gambling per se. Notably, Lynn Stout, in a
1999 article, expressed support for derivatives regulation based in large
part on antigambling considerations.13 As far as we know, our Article
provides a more concrete proposal grounded more firmly in economic
principles than the rest of the literature.
Our proposal is not as radical as it might seem at first. Our main goal
is to regulate a form of gambling that takes place in financial markets. This
type of regulation goes back at least to the eighteenth century when the
British government enacted a statute that introduced the “insurable interest”
rule to insurance markets. The main purpose of the insurable interest rule
was to prevent people from using insurance contracts to gamble.14 The rule
remains a fixture of the common law and state insurance regulation. There
is also a longstanding common law rule against wagering, which courts
have on occasion used to void certain kinds of financial products.15
Additional rules have long been used to limit gambling in financial
markets.16 Indeed, not even the idea of ex ante regulation of derivatives is
new. The SEC and particularly the CFTC have long had the power to curb
gambling in the financial markets. Before 2000, financial innovators who
sought to trade new derivatives on commodities exchanges were required

Regulation of Securities Intermediaries, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1961 (2010); and Brian J.M. Quinn, The
Failure of Private Ordering and the Financial Crisis of 2008, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 549, 602−03 (2009)
(proposing additional regulation of financial markets).
11
See, e.g., Xue Wang, Increased Disclosure Requirements and Corporate Governance Decisions:
Evidence from Chief Financial Officers in the Pre- and Post-Sarbanes–Oxley Periods, 48 J. ACCT. RES.
885 (2010); John Y. Campbell et al., The Regulation of Consumer Financial Products: An Introductory
Essay with Four Case Studies (Harvard Kennedy Sch., Working Paper RWP10-040, 2010), available at
http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/4450128/Madrian_TheRegulationof.pdf.
12
See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2008);
Daniel Carpenter et al., Approval Regulation and Endogenous Consumer Confidence: Theory and
Analogies to Licensing, Safety, and Financial Regulation, 4 REG. & GOVERNANCE 383 (2010).
13
Stout uses Hirshleifer’s insight to argue that courts should not enforce financial contracts that are
used for gambling. See Lynn A. Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and Private
Ordering in the Market for OTC Derivatives, 48 DUKE L.J. 701 (1999); see also Timothy E. Lynch,
Gambling by Another Name; The Challenge of Purely Speculative Derivatives, 17 STAN. J.L. BUS. &
FIN. 67 (2011) (discussing the relationship between gambling and derivatives markets); Omarova, supra
note 5, at 68–74 (addressing the problem of speculation).
14
See ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW
275−82 (5th ed. 2012).
15
See, e.g., Irwin v. Williar, 110 U.S. 499, 510 (1884).
16
See Stout, supra note 13, at 713−34.
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to obtain the approval of the CFTC and related agencies before selling
them.17 The CFTC used (or purported to use) an ill-defined “economic
purpose” test to determine whether a derivative could be traded or not.
Under this test, the applicant was required to show that the derivative
served some legitimate economic purpose, such as insurance, and would
not be used mainly for gambling.18 However, the CFTC liberalized its
approval requirements prior to 2000, and in 2000 Congress enacted the
Commodities Futures Modernization Act,19 which ensured that these
derivatives would continue to be unregulated.20 This law was the
culmination of the deregulation of the 1990s and set the stage for an
explosion in derivatives trading. From 2000 to 2008, trade in over-thecounter derivatives increased from $95.2 trillion to $592 trillion—a spike
of 522%.21 Our proposal seeks to revive and develop the institutional status
quo prior to 2000 and to provide a clearer and more precise rule for
regulating derivatives.
We should be clear that we identify one specific problem with
financial markets—the welfare-reducing effects of gambling on the
gamblers themselves—and do not intend our proposal to be a
comprehensive response to all the problems with financial markets. Thus,
we ignore certain problems like fraud, which have already received a great
deal of attention; the problem of confusion and misunderstanding, which
may justify paternalistic regulation; and, for the most part, we ignore the
problem of systemic risk, which is different from and more complicated
than the problems we address. However, if speculative trading were
suppressed, then systemic risk should decline as well because systemic risk
is an outgrowth of the total risk in the financial system, which is increased
by gambling.22
17

Omarova, supra note 5, at 89.
See Thomas Lee Hazen, Rational Investments, Speculation, or Gambling?—Derivative Securities
and Financial Futures and Their Effect on the Underlying Capital Markets, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 987,
1029−31 (1992); Laurin C. Ariail, Note, The Impact of Dodd-Frank on End-Users Hedging
Commercial Risk in Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets, 15 N.C. BANKING INST. 175, 196−97
(2011).
19
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 1(a)(5), 114 Stat. 2763, 2763
(enacting the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA), H.R. 5660, 106th Cong.).
20
See Thomas Lee Hazen, Filling a Regulatory Gap: It Is Time to Regulate Over-the-Counter
Derivatives, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 123, 128−29 (2009) (discussing history). The Dodd–Frank Act
repeals some provisions of the CFMA. For details, see DERIVATIVES: LEGAL PRACTICE AND
STRATEGIES § 16.06 (Robert D. Aicher ed., Supp. 2011).
21
BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET ACTIVITY IN THE SECOND HALF OF
2008, at 1 (2009), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy0905.pdf; Press Release, Bank for Int’l
Settlements, Slowdown of the Global OTC Derivatives Market in the Second Half of 2000, at 1 (May
16, 2001), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy0105.pdf.
22
Many others have argued that financial products used for gambling purposes, like CDSs, can also
create systemic risk, which creates an additional reason for regulating them. See, e.g., Gerding, supra
note 10, at 63−65.
18
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BENEFITS AND HARMS OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION

A. Financial Markets and Social Welfare
Financial markets are markets in which people lend money, make
investments, and trade securities, including derivatives. Financial markets
can be distinguished from the “real economy,” where people trade goods
and services. It is tempting to think that if the real economy should be
largely unregulated (as it is), then the financial markets should be as well.
However, there are important distinctions between financial markets and
the real economy, and so the regulatory implications are different as well.
1.

Insurance Versus Gambling

a. Insurance.—Most individuals face a variety of idiosyncratic
risks in their lives related to the sources of their labor income (their firm,
industry, country, etc.), the price levels they face (currency risk, transport
costs, housing prices, etc.), natural disasters, and other shocks. They may
also face risks associated with the limited pool of capital investments
available to them. Financial markets clearly help solve these problems by
facilitating insurance and by allowing more diversified financial
investments.
In economic terms, most people are assumed to be risk averse, which
means that they will choose an investment that pays off with high
probability to an investment that pays off with low probability, even if the
expected value of the two investments are the same.23 For example, most
people would choose a certain payoff of $10,000 to a 50/50 payoff of
$20,000 or $0, even though the expected value of the two investments is
the same. Commentators attribute this phenomenon to the diminishing
utility of money.24 A person gains more in utility as she goes from $0 to
$10,000 than she gains as she goes from $10,000 to $20,000. Thus, she
prefers an outcome of $10,000 in all states of the world to an outcome of
$0 in one state of the world and an outcome of $20,000 in another state of
the world, where the probability of each state of the world is 0.5.
For this reason, a person who faces a risk of a negative shock to her
income (like job loss or ill health) will be willing to buy insurance, which,
in effect, transfers wealth from the “good state” to the “bad state.” Consider
an example taken from the early modern period when insurance markets
were in their infancy. Suppose that merchants outfit ships and send them
across the ocean to trade with foreign countries. Each merchant owns a ship
laden with goods, which we will suppose is worth $100. The ship faces a
1/100 risk that it will be captured by pirates or sunk in a storm. If a
merchant loses his ship, he will be ruined. Now suppose that 100 merchants
23
24

See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 44–46 (6th ed. 2012).
See id.
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enter an agreement under which they promise to share the loss if a ship is
sunk. If, for example, each merchant agrees to pay the victim $1, then in
expectation, each merchant bears only a $1 loss (the $1 payment if his ship
does not sink and receipt of $99 if his ship does sink). Thus, for each
merchant, a 1/100 risk of losing $100 has been transformed from a low risk
of losing a large amount to the certainty of losing a very small amount. The
deal is mutually advantageous because of the merchants’ risk aversion.
Today, an insurance company would serve as an intermediary—receiving
the $1 premiums from the merchants and then paying out to the victim—
but the principle is the same.
There are countless other examples of people insuring themselves
against various financial shocks. For example, farmers can insure
themselves against adverse price movements for their products by entering
the futures market, where they sell their products in advance of the harvest.
A person who owns a great deal of real estate might insure herself against
adverse price movements in the real estate market by purchasing financial
products whose value is uncorrelated (or, ideally, inversely correlated) with
the value of real estate. Businesses also purchase insurance. Although large
businesses are probably not risk averse in the same sense as individuals (as
shareholders can protect themselves against risk by diversifying their
holdings), they often buy insurance. They may seek to minimize the risk
that adverse price movements will drive them into bankruptcy, where
organizational capital is lost, or possibly because managers themselves are
risk averse about their jobs or about the availability of external capital for
investments.
The key thing to note about this insurance is that the conditions under
which it provides a satisfying explanation for financial activity are simple
and clear. Individuals on the two sides of a trade should be exposed to
some source of risk, and the trade they undertake should mitigate their
aggregate exposure to risk. Where the person on one side of the transaction
gambles and the other side insures, then we will refer to such a transaction
as an “insurance” transaction only if aggregate risk is reduced.
b. Gambling.—Different individuals within financial markets
often have, or act as if they have, different views about future economic
events. These (de facto) differences of opinion are deeper than mere
differences in information. Some are simply the outcomes of differing
opinions and beliefs, which are not terribly different from those motivating
gambling. Others represent the fact that tax or regulatory treatment is
different for various market participants, and thus equivalent assets may be
of differing values to different participants without being of different social
value in the hands of the participants; such “gambling” is really a form of
regulatory or tax arbitrage. Similar effects may arise even when no explicit
regulations are in place but investors judge assets based on imperfect
heuristics; if agents in one jurisdiction use the rating of a bond, for
1314
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example, as an imperfect proxy for risk, they will effectively act as if they
believe that such bonds are of uniformly lower risk than other assets, even
if, in individual situations, this is not the case.
As argued by Itzhak Gibloa, Dov Samet, and David Schmeidler, as
well as one of us (Weyl), gambling is harmful because it exposes the
speculators to risk without fully compensating them.25 When two people bet
over whether a coin will turn up heads, they each incur the risk that they
will be poorer in the future, when, assuming that they are risk averse, the
gain will not be sufficient to outweigh the loss in terms of utility. Thus,
rational people will not engage in gambling in the first place unless (1) they
like to gamble (in which case there are cheaper ways, like casinos, to
satisfy this preference), (2) at least one party is confused (which we believe
is extremely common), or (3) they are engaging in regulatory arbitrage
(which is also extremely common26).
It is tempting to believe that a financial trade is like the sale of a
commodity. Two people trade money for a TV set because each is made
better off by the transaction; therefore, it must be the case that two people
who, say, trade oil futures must be made better off by the transaction.
However, that need not be the case. Suppose that two people hold identical
portfolios and thus are equally exposed to the risk that the price of oil will
rise. However, person 1 believes that the current price of $80 is too low and
that it will rise to $90 next week, while person 2 believes that the price will
stay at $80. By entering the derivatives market, person 1 and person 2
could make a bet on the price of oil. For example, person 2 could agree to
sell a barrel of oil to person 1 for $85. If the price of oil stays at $80, person
2 makes a profit of $5 (by buying oil in the spot market for $80 and
reselling to person 2 for $85); if the price of oil rises to $90, person 1
makes a profit of $5 (by buying oil from person 2 for $85 and then reselling
to the market for $90). Note that normally the parties will settle their
transaction without the delivery of oil.
The movement in the price of oil vindicates either person 1’s
prediction or person 2’s prediction. Ex post, therefore, the transaction is a
zero-sum game: one party will be better off at the expense of the other
party. Furthermore, because the bet introduces greater risk into the lives of
both participants, assuming both are risk averse, they are on average worse
off from the transaction. Thus, regardless of who is right, both would agree
that the transaction is inefficient and that if they gain from it, it is only at
the greater expense of the other party.
We will return to the question of whether people should be permitted
to gamble. For now, we note only that if people should be permitted to
25

Gilboa et al., supra note 2; Weyl manuscript, supra note 7, at 4−5.
“Regulatory arbitrage consists of those financial transactions designed specifically to reduce
costs or capture profit opportunities created by differential regulations or laws.” Frank Partnoy,
Financial Derivatives and the Costs of Regulatory Arbitrage, 22 J. CORP. L. 211, 227 (1997).
26
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gamble, there is no reason to permit them to gamble using the financial
markets, where many people cannot understand the nature of their
transactions.27 But probably the major reason for gambling by sophisticated
businesses is regulatory (or tax) arbitrage. Consider, for example, a bank,
which under banking law must retain a capital cushion, which both reduces
the risk of insolvency and limits the bank’s ability to engage in high-risk,
high-payoff investments. The reason for this rule is that the government
pays off creditors when banks default, so creditors have inadequate
incentives to monitor banks, and thus banks have excessive incentives to
engage in risk.28 Banks have an incentive to participate in the derivatives
market simply to increase their risk exposure, which is profitable because
the government bears the downside if the gambles do not pay off, while the
bank gains the upside if they do. This type of regulatory arbitrage is
socially harmful not only, or even primarily, because it allows the
regulation to be violated, but more importantly because the transaction
itself increases risk while serving no economic purpose other than avoiding
the regulation. Thus, even if one believes that the regulation is itself
imperfect, the increase in risk undertaken to avoid it will typically
outweigh whatever benefits might in principle accrue from it thereby being
relaxed.
Gambling can also occur as a result of investors relying on heuristics,
the rules that simplify investment.29 An ordinary person might use a
heuristic like “buy a stock that has recently risen,” falsely believing that if a
stock has risen in the past, it is more likely to rise in the future.
Municipalities and pension funds use heuristics like “buy a bond that has a
AAA rating.” Sophisticated investors like hedge funds can easily take
advantage of such heuristics. When large numbers of people use the first
heuristic, counterparties will infer that stocks will be at least temporarily
overvalued and can earn returns by selling short after the price of a stock
spikes.30 The prevalence of the second heuristic caused financial
institutions to construct AAA-related synthetic bonds by combining income
streams from bonds that were in theory only weakly correlated, but the
correlation within and across bonds turned out to be high enough to

27

See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 252–53
(4th ed. 2009).
29
For a discussion, see Agarwal et al., supra note 7.
30
See Werner F.M. De Bondt & Richard Thaler, Does the Stock Market Overreact?, 40 J. FIN. 793
(1985); Werner F.M. De Bondt & Richard H. Thaler, Financial Decision-Making in Markets and
Firms: A Behavioral Perspective, in 9 HANDBOOKS IN OPERATIONS RESEARCH AND MANAGEMENT
SCIENCE: FINANCE 385 (R.A. Jarrow et al. eds., 1995). By “ordinary people,” we mean to include even
highly intelligent people, who frequently make the most elementary investing errors from the standpoint
of financial theory. See, e.g., James J. Choi et al., $100 Bills on the Sidewalk: Suboptimal Investment in
401(k) Plans, 93 REV. ECON. & STAT. 748 (2011).
28
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massively increase systemic risk, which helped cause the financial crisis of
2008 and rendered many AAA bonds worthless.31
We should be clear that it is not the main purpose of our proposal to
protect consumers and other unsophisticated investors from shady practices
or their own ignorance. A variety of legal rules, plus the new Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), are more appropriately tailored to
address these problems. In addition, consumers can be exploited even when
they engage in legitimate insurance transactions, which it is not our
purpose to limit. Our goal is rather to deter financial gambling because it is
welfare reducing and contributes to systemic risk.
It is sometimes suggested that gambling by unsophisticated investors
is socially desirable because those investors’ poor decisions in effect
provide monetary rewards to people who invest in financial sophistication.
The sophisticated parties enter into transactions with the unsophisticated
parties in order to earn high returns, and these transactions produce a
positive externality in the form of more accurate prices for securities.
However, a well-known line of research has demonstrated that this intuition
is wrong: markets are more efficient if unsophisticated investors are kept
out of them.32
Gambling has its telltale signs, almost precisely opposite those of
insurance. Gambling typically occurs between individuals who differ in
some belief, heuristic, or exposure to some tax or regulatory provision,
either directly or indirectly (through financial intermediaries who have had
risk transferred to them through contracts).
c. The insurance–gambling spectrum.—Above we focused on
the extreme cases of purely insurance transactions (where both sides gained
insurance from the transactions) and purely gambling ones (where both
sides added to their risk). We did this for conceptual clarity, but in reality,
most transactions are somewhere in between these. Such transactions
involve transfer of risks from those less able to bear them to those more
able to bear them in the case of transactions that are mostly insurance, and
the opposite direction in the case of mostly gambling transactions. It is
therefore useful to consider a spectrum between purely insurance
transactions and purely gambling ones.



Pure insurance. A pure insurance transaction, like the arrangement
between merchants described above, reduces the risk both sides
face.
Selling insurance. Perhaps a more common transaction involves an
“insurance company” selling insurance for a fee to a purchaser who

31

SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT
FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 138−40 (2010).
32
See, for example, J. Bradford De Long et al., Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets, 98 J. POL.
ECON. 703 (1990), and the many papers building off of this work.
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has a concentrated risk. For example, individuals often purchase
insurance on their house, car, or life to insure against events that
could significantly reduce their wealth. This is a beneficial
transaction because the purchaser of the insurance faces a
concentrated risk while the seller of the insurance is diversified
across many risks and thus is better able to bear the risk thus
transferred to it. Issuing equity shares in a company similarly
transfers the risk faced by that company to a broader group in the
public, reducing the risk faced by the original owner without
increasing by as much the risk faced by the public. Thus, while the
insurance company or public do increase their risk, risk in the
system as a whole has been reduced. Thus such “insurance selling”
trades are a net benefit.
Neutral risk transfers. A third category, which is neither net
beneficial nor harmful, is when individuals with equally
concentrated risks transfer them from one to the other. For example,
if two individuals with a similar exposure to Microsoft’s success or
failure trade a share of the stock from one to the other, one gains
risk while the other loses it. On net, risk in the system has neither
increased nor decreased and thus the transaction is not a net gain or
harm. The majority of trades in traditional securities, such as stocks
and bonds, likely fall in this category or somewhere near it.
Risk hoarding. Some risk transfers are harmful, however. For
example, if a well-diversified index fund held by the public and
owning a range of stocks sells a share of Microsoft to a Microsoft
low-level employee whose livelihood is tied up in Microsoft’s
success, this trade increases the risk faced by the employee much
more than it decreases the risk facing the index fund. Such
transactions are on net gambling, reflecting the employee’s desire to
bet further on the success of her firm.33 Thus, despite decreasing the
risk to the index fund, they are still harmful.
Pure gambling. A pure gambling transaction is one where both sides
increase the risk they face, as in the betting-on-oil example above.

Markus Brunnermeier, Alp Simsek, and Wei Xiong considered a
number of difficult cases and performed calculations to determine whether
the transactions should be classified as on-net gambling or on-net
insurance.34 The standard they applied, and which we adopt, can be seen by
noting that in an insurance transaction (whether pure or selling insurance),
both sides believe the other is made better off by the transaction. In a
gambling transaction, both sides believe the other is made worse off by

33
34

However, as we will see below, we do not believe it is feasible to prevent all such transactions.
See Brunnermeier et al., supra note 9.
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engaging in the transaction.35 That is, in a gambling transaction, while the
two sides disagree (or are induced by heuristics or regulatory arbitrage to
act as if they disagree), and therefore bet, about the likelihood of the
outcome, both agree that the transaction is inefficient, in the sense that
everyone would be better off if the transaction did not occur and some
transfer was made between the parties. Brunnermeier and his coauthors call
such transactions “belief-neutral inefficient,” and it is the belief-neutral
inefficiency of gambling transactions that we treat as their harm.36
2.

Capital Allocation and Informational Racing

a. Capital allocation.—Firms need capital to make investments.
Before the development of modern equity and bond markets, the owner of a
firm would borrow from local banks or obtain equity investments from
wealthy friends and acquaintances. Securities markets vastly expand the
sources of financing. When banks are unwilling to make loans because they
cannot take on any more default risk, firms can sell bonds on the market,
reaching any member of the public who is willing to lend money in return
for interest. Similarly, modern equity markets enable firms to obtain
investments from the general public rather than a handful of rich friends.
People are more likely to buy bonds and stocks than to make loans or
unsecuritized investments because they can easily liquidate their positions
by selling the securities if they need money. As we discuss below, other
financial innovations like mutual funds have further extended the reach of
the capital markets.37
Such liquidity can be seen as primarily a form of diversification,
allowing small groups of investors in a firm to offload risk to the broader
public; thus, it may be seen as fundamentally similar to the insurance
function of markets. However, liquid financial markets also play an
important and different role, helping ensure that capital gets to the right
place by making clear how much other people value the activities of firms.
An investor who buys Facebook stock is making a bet as to how much
money Facebook will earn by providing a service in the real economy. If
people could not buy stock in this “speculative” manner (or make loans,
etc.), businesses with good ideas would have a great deal of trouble
implementing those ideas and thus providing benefits to consumers, while
companies with poor ideas might receive capital because no one would
ensure that the price of their stocks or bonds remained low. Thus, financial
market activity that helps prices adjust to their true value can influence the
allocation of capital among potential products and thus improve economic
efficiency.

35
36
37

Id. at 1–2.
Id. at 2 (emphasis omitted).
See infra notes 69–76.
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However, improving the informational efficiency of prices is only
useful to the extent that it reflects the fundamental (social) value of the
asset and affects the allocation of capital in the real economy. When
fluctuations are too unpredictable and too driven by expectations of other
traders’ behavior or shifts in prices over too short of time scales to have
any impact on the real economy, they cannot have value under this
argument.
b. Informational racing.—Markets in the real economy produce
an efficient allocation of resources, at least in ideal conditions. As
discussed above, financial markets do not. Investors’ incentives to purchase
securities are not necessarily aligned with the public interest.
The problem is best understood by way of illustration. It takes its most
extreme form in the phenomenon of high-speed trading, where hedge funds
invest large resources to obtain information a nanosecond earlier than their
rivals. In the recent film Margin Call, the CEO of the large investment
bank at the center of the film lectures his assembled staff that on Wall
Street there are three ways to make money: “Be first. Be smarter. Or cheat.
Now I don’t cheat. And although I like to think we have some pretty smart
people in this building, it sure is a hell of a lot easier to just be first.”38 The
race to be first is epitomized by the recent construction of a $300 million
fiber optic cable connection between Chicago and New York that shaves
three milliseconds off communication times between the two locations.39
This project was profitable because of the opportunities it created for
numerous small arbitrages between the two markets using automated
trading algorithms. Society gains little, if anything, from this tiny speedup
because there are few, if any, real economic opportunities to use the
information in the relevant time interval. For example, a farmer deciding
whether to plant corn or wheat does not benefit from obtaining market
prices a few milliseconds earlier. The information-racing effect was first
studied by Hirshleifer and is widely accepted in the economics
community.40 Note that it does not only occur in extreme cases of very
high-frequency trading. It occurs any time a firm can make more money
from having information first, and society does not proportionally gain
from the early arrival of this information for fundamental allocative
purposes. Indeed, firms can overinvest in information from a social
standpoint in other ways—for example, spending enormous resources
developing algorithms that give them a slight advantage over other firms.
The hallmark of informational racing is trading that takes places more
rapidly, unpredictably, and erratically than could impact real capital
allocations. The appropriate metric for “too fast” is always the speed at
38
39
40

MARGIN CALL (Before the Door Pictures 2011).
Matt Dellinger, The Million-Dollar Millisecond, POPULAR SCI., May 2011, at 33.
Hirshleifer, supra note 2.
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which decisions on real capital allocations or related economic decisions
can take place. For example, a financial market in electricity futures may
need, for purely economic purposes, to operate with great speed because
automated generation systems depend on moment-to-moment changes in
expected energy prices to determine current generation (though probably
on the scale of seconds rather than milliseconds). On the other hand, little
in terms of capital allocation would be lost if most common equities traded
daily, or even weekly, rather than minute to minute, because stock issuance
and other evaluations of corporate strategy based on share prices are very
infrequent events. Thus, while a high speed of trades always provides an
indication that trading is likely to be primarily racing rather than aiding
capital allocation, the relevant speeds must be compared to those of
fundamental decisionmakers in the relevant markets.
3. Positive Information Externalities.—Some financial instruments
may generate positive externalities by revealing to the market and to
policymakers information about underlying events. Prediction markets
have been praised for this function. In a prediction market, people buy and
sell securities that pay off based on a future event of general interest—such
as the winner of the next presidential election. If the wisdom of crowds is
revealed as a result of betting on the winner of the next presidential
election, people who do not participate in the market but can learn about
the value of the publicly traded securities can more easily plan their lives
with this information.41 A similar claim has been made about Credit Default
Swaps (CDS), insurance policies on bonds whose value reveals the
likelihood that the firm that issues the underlying bonds will default.42
Investors can obtain information about the financial health of a borrower by
observing the price of CDSs on the borrower’s bonds.
However, we are skeptical about this claim in most cases. The market
price of a CDS for a bond reveals no more information about the likelihood
of default than the price of the bond itself relative to the price of a baseline
risk-free security. If the firm is likely to default, then its bonds will trade at
well below par value; the fact that the corresponding CDS will trade above
par value (because the probability of default has risen above what it was
when the CDS was sold) adds no information. Moreover, speeded-up
disclosure of information is socially valuable only when it helps people
plan in the real economy, and, as we have noted, private incentives to

41

See, e.g., MICHAEL ABRAMOWICZ, PREDICTOCRACY: MARKET MECHANISMS FOR PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE DECISION MAKING (2007); INFORMATION MARKETS: A NEW WAY OF MAKING DECISIONS
(Robert W. Hahn & Paul C. Tetlock eds., 2006).
42
See Haibin Zhu, An Empirical Comparison of Credit Spreads Between the Bond Market and the
Credit Default Swap Market (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 160, 2004).
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obtain information and the public benefit are not necessarily aligned.43 In
this respect, financial products yield positive informational externalities in
similar situations to when they impact the real allocation of capital.
However, informational externalities are distinct from the allocation of
capital because they provide useful information to individuals not directly
transacting in the assets, including and often primarily government
policymakers.
B. Tests for Evaluating Financial Innovation
How can these considerations be given practical application? The
Financial Products Agency should be guided by a test that it can use to
evaluate proposed financial products. Ideally, the test should be as precise
as possible, but it is a commonplace that regulatory agencies must apply
general standards because of the complexity of regulated activity.
The general question is whether a proposed financial product advances
social welfare or not. As we saw above, the answer to this question depends
on how the financial product would affect the incidence of insurance (or
gambling) and capital allocation (or informational racing), and whether the
financial product would generate positive informational externalities.44
Some of our discussion will unavoidably be abstract, but we will
supplement it with concrete examples in section C.
1. Insurance and Gambling.—The agency’s fundamental standard
would be whether the welfare gains from insurance allowed by a new
product exceed the likely costs created by the gambling it facilitates. To
identify the likely sources of demand, the agency’s evaluation of a financial
product would begin with a market demand analysis of the sort performed
by any firm planning to market a new financial product.45 The agency
would then classify these sources of demand as insurance or gambling and
quantify the benefits and harms arising from each.
The method for performing this analysis proceeds as follows.46 Every
financial product pays out if some event X occurs and otherwise pays out a
lower amount or nothing at all.47 The agency estimates the number of
43

Hahn and Tetlock support prediction markets, but because of potential negative externalities
including gambling, they advocate regulation by the CFTC. See Robert W. Hahn & Paul C. Tetlock, A
New Approach for Regulating Information Markets, 29 J. REG. ECON. 265, 269−72 (2006).
44
Stout proposes a similar general test but does not go into detail as to how it would be
administered in practice. Ultimately, she argues that if courts refuse to enforce derivatives, in practice
gambling would be restricted while insurance would continue because parties that insure tend to be
repeat players who will voluntarily comply with contracts, while parties that gamble will not be. See
Stout, supra note 13, at 778−80. We do not put similar emphasis on nonlegal market dynamics.
45
Of the sort performed in, for example, Simsek, supra note 9.
46
We draw on Athanasoulis & Shiller, supra note 9, and Simsek, supra note 9.
47
X could be some general event like a sovereign default on a bond or a specific event like a
person’s death.
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people whose wealth or income is inversely correlated with X and
determines their next-best financial product for insuring against the loss of
wealth or income that occurs when X occurs. This information should be
available from the firm seeking approval; after all, it should be
incorporated in the demand analysis the firm uses to decide whether to
market the financial product in the first place. The agency would thus just
need to check the firm’s calculations and ensure that the firm used reliable
data, which in most cases will be publicly available. Using this method, the
agency will obtain an estimate of the total value of the financial product for
insurance purposes—essentially, the aggregate willingness to pay of all the
people whose wealth or income is inversely correlated with X.
The crucial step would be to determine the costs of the new
instruments based on how many individuals would be interested in
speculating on them and at what volume. The key to a careful analysis is to
break down speculative demand itself into several categories:
disagreement-based, regulatory arbitrage-based, tax arbitrage-based, and
heuristic-exploiting. Quantifying each of these involves identifying
individuals likely to be interested in purchasing the product and projecting
the quantity of their anticipated demand. The methods most effective for
this differ across the types of speculative activity, as we now discuss.
a. Pure disagreement-based gambling.—This is perhaps the
hardest of all the forms of gambling to project demand on because so much
depends on what catches the imagination of potential participants. Luckily,
a large historical track record of past products offers a rich data set on
which regressions using ex ante characteristics of products can be run to
project ex post gambling. Such gambling can then be measured based on
observed volumes compared to the demand accounted for by the other
sources of demand (both insurance and other speculative forms discussed
below). For example, one natural predictor of speculative demand is to
survey professional forecasters for their estimates of the value of the
security.48 If, for example, the forecasters agree on the value of the security,
then it cannot be used to gamble. If the distribution of estimates is
sufficiently wide, however, it can be used to gamble. Other predictive
factors may relate to how prominent the phenomenon that the derivative is
based on is in the public mind or in commonly used financial models.
These can be quantified using new tools of automated text analysis, such as
Google’s Ngram Viewer.49 By harnessing data on past products and the
speculative demand they generated, indicators like this could be used to
form clearer expectations of likely speculative demand, in conjunction with
documents that the proposer will submit about the sources of demand they
anticipate and projections by similar but disinterested market players.
48
49

This view has been suggested by Simsek, supra note 9, at 22.
GOOGLE BOOKS NGRAM VIEWER, http://books.google.com/ngrams (last visited May 21, 2013).
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b. Regulatory arbitrage-based gambling.—Shen, Yan, and
Zhang argue that financial instruments often give an opportunity to engage
in gambling while posting less collateral or capital than would have been
required for similar exposure in the past.50 More generally, new instruments
offer opportunities for undermining capital requirements, including those
being introduced in Basel III.51 The capital adequacy rules are supposed to
prevent banks from taking excessive risk by requiring them to keep
shareholder equity on the line, but financial innovation can result in
products that enable banks to increase their exposure to risk without
affecting their balance sheet. The potential demand for such innovation is
particularly easy to gauge if data is available on the portfolios of the
relevant institutions prior to the introduction of the innovation. These are
disclosed in capital adequacy reporting and could be analyzed to determine
how much exploiting new instruments would allow a bank to reduce its
capital burden while maintaining the same exposure. This would then be
used to quantify the regulatory arbitrage-based speculative demand, given
estimates of the cost of holding capital widely available in the finance
literature.52 Similar analyses would be possible for other regulations that
might be arbitraged by new products, such as portfolio composition and
separation between banking and investment banking activities.
c. Tax arbitrage-based gambling.—Tax arbitrage is a wellunderstood and measurable phenomenon. Firms hire tax lawyers to design
products that enable investors to obtain lower tax rates without changing
their real economic activity. The demand for tax arbitrage can thus be
measured and used to estimate the arbitrage costs of the proposed
instrument in the same manner as regulatory arbitrage.53
d. Heuristic arbitrage-based gambling.—Heuristic arbitrage is
more complicated. A large literature establishes that people’s trading
strategies often reflect simple heuristics (buy a stock that has recently
increased in price) that can be easily exploited by hedge funds.54 By
considering such heuristics and how they interact with the product’s
characteristics, the agency could project demand based on heuristic
50

Ji Shen et al., Collateral-Motivated Financial Innovation (Aug. 8, 2012) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2014928.
51
BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS (rev. ed. 2011), available at http://www.bis.org/
publ/bcbs189.pdf.
52
David VanHoose, Theories of Bank Behavior Under Capital Regulation, 31 J. BANKING & FIN.
3680, 3695 (2007); Shen et al., supra note 50, at 3.
53
For a general discussion of tax arbitrage involving derivatives, see David M. Schizer, Sticks and
Snakes: Derivatives and Curtailing Aggressive Tax Planning, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1339 (2000).
54
See, e.g., De Bondt & Thaler, Does the Stock Market Overreact?, supra note 30; Robert J.
Shiller, Human Behavior and the Efficiency of the Financial System (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 6375, 1998), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w6375.pdf.
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arbitrage. While doing so will be difficult in some cases, in others it will be
relatively straightforward. For example, many investors and mutual funds
heavily favor products with strong credit ratings even though these do not
necessarily have better systemic risk than other lower rated products. While
a rating is a proxy for systemic risk in some cases, it is a highly imperfect
one. New products designed to achieve a strong rating, but with atypical
systemic risk characteristics historically relative to other products carrying
this high rating, are likely to generate a large demand from the institutions
that focus on purchasing highly rated credit.55 This demand can be
estimated based on previous demand for innovative, highly rated but
systemically exposed derivatives.
Regardless of the difficulties of judging these questions, the agency’s
goal would not be to confidently project all potential consequences of
introducing the new product into the distant future. Instead, it would reach
a pragmatic expectation of likely short- to medium-term speculative and
insurance demand for the products, just as the firm introducing the product
would have to in order to project its likely profits. If these analyses, in their
most general or one of their simplified forms, were to yield a clear answer
on the balance of expectations, the inquiry could stop there. But if there is
ambiguity, regulators can ask additional questions that require more
judgment to answer. We turn to these now.
2.

The Role that the Financial Product Plays in the Allocation of
Capital.—A financial instrument may lower the cost of capital to
firms and individuals. Such reductions in the cost of capital result from the
ability to spread the risk more evenly. For example, prior to the
securitization of “junk bonds” in the 1980s, many small firms could draw
only on very wealthy investors for financing. Similarly, prior to the
creation of mutual funds, as we discuss below, equity financing was
available to a much more limited number of companies because venture
capitalists were unable to sell their equity stakes in public markets.
However, such benefits of new financial products are fundamentally just
examples of one of the benefits of insurance. The current concentrated
owners of the risky assets of the firm are able to sell them to investors
better able to bear this risk because of their greater diversification. Thus,
this classic “capital allocation” role of new financial instruments is
subsumed in our first test, correctly interpreted. However, in the analysis of
market demand, a special emphasis might in some cases be placed on the
role a new structure would play in the financing of new firms, liquidation
of existing inefficient firms, and the transfer of assets across firms.

55

See Donald MacKenzie, The Credit Crisis as a Problem in the Sociology of Knowledge, 116 AM.
J. SOC. 1778 (2011) (arguing that such gaming of the system played an important role in creating the
poor allocation of risk that destabilized the financial system and resulted in the credit crisis).
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Alternatively, a financial instrument could help create superior
incentives for firms and managers within the firms, as some argued was the
case with leveraged buyout structures and stock options.56 The value of
such a structure in promoting beneficial incentives could be evaluated
quantitatively using the standard techniques of theoretical and empirical
contract theory.57
Benefits indirectly facilitated by improving the informational
efficiency of prices would be more difficult to gauge. No research in
finance theory has, to our knowledge, yet established any clear link
between the informational efficiency of prices and the quality of real
capital allocation. Thus, a high threshold would have to be met for claims
by the promoter of the new product to persuade the agency of substantial
benefits from improvements in informational efficiency. The improvement
of informational efficiency alone would not be sufficient; a clear and
cognizable link to the quality of capital allocation would have to be made.
3. How the Instrument Affects the Speed of Transactions.—If the
creation of a new derivative facilitates high-frequency, informational racing
transactions, this is an important cost that must be weighed against the
instrument’s benefits. For example, CDSs facilitate taking positions on the
credit spread of a particular bond. This was possible, but difficult, before
the invention of that instrument. To understand this point, suppose that an
investor believes that GM bonds are likely to default and hopes to make
money by betting on default. Before the invention of CDSs, the investor
would adopt a short position on the bond by convincing someone to lend
the bond to her in return for a promise to pay interest. The investor would
then sell the bond at the current price, and when the debt became due, buy
it again at the now lower (according to the buyer’s expectation) market
price, and return it to the lender plus interest. If the price fell enough, the
investor made a profit by betting against GM. But this transaction was
difficult to undertake. The investor would have to provide collateral to the
lender to secure repayment, and the collateral or margin requirements
would be quite high. By contrast, today an investor can bet against GM
simply by buying a CDS on the GM bond, which pays out if GM defaults
(and whose price increases as the risk of default rises). The margin
requirements for exposure to CDSs are less costly than those for shorting.
56

See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers,
76 AM. ECON. REV. 323, 325−26 (1986).
57
On the theoretical side, see Bengt Holmström & Jean Tirole, Market Liquidity and Performance
Monitoring, 101 J. POL. ECON. 678 (1993), and Darrell Duffie, Innovations in Credit Risk Transfer:
Implications for Financial Stability (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 255, 2008)
(providing a framework for evaluating the incentive benefits of Collateralized Debt Obligations
(CDOs)). On the empirical side, see Emmanuel Saez, Using Elasticities to Derive Optimal Income Tax
Rates, 68 REV. ECON. STUD. 205 (2001) (providing analysis of optimal income taxation using empirical
data and a contract theoretic model).
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The cost savings can easily be measured by these avoided hassles, which
could be gauged by asking financial consultants to structure the lowest cost
means of gaining a desired exposure with and without the new instrument.
The difference is an implicit tax on the relevant transaction that is
removed by the new instrument. The effect of removing such a tax is, of
course, the opposite of introducing a tax, as suggested by James Tobin, as a
means of slowing down the speed of financial transactions.58 Because it is
easier to buy a CDS than to short a bond, the invention of CDSs increased
the velocity and magnitude of trade based on bets as to whether a firm (or
country) will default. It would be difficult to calculate the precise harm
caused by this development, but it seems likely that most transactions
deterred by a small transaction cost like the cost involved in shorting are
unlikely to be of significant value because investors likely profit only from
economically unimportant short-term asset movements. Thus, one can
estimate the number of harmful transactions roughly by the effect of any
past price movement on the cost of the transaction. Such movement allows
the estimation of how much the volume of trading responds to its cost.
Assuming all transactions that only occur when possible at sufficiently low
cost are wasteful, one can combine this “elasticity” with the expected
reduction in cost created by the new instrument to estimate the number of
harmful transactions likely to be created.
4. Positive Externalities.—As we noted above, we are skeptical that
most innovative financial instruments produce positive informational
externalities. Nonetheless, the FPA should give the applicant the
opportunity to prove that the positive externalities will exceed the cost.
Proving that additional information is revealed is not sufficient: it must also
be shown that this information is useful to individuals in the economy in
their planning and in government decisionmaking.
For example, prediction markets, where people bet on public events
like the winner of the next election, arguably create positive externalities
because they greatly improve existing substitutes like polling.59 But these
markets also allow people to gamble. It is unclear to us whether the
benefits exceed the costs. Perhaps a strong case could be made for certain
prediction markets, like those related to politics or international affairs. But
other prediction markets, like those related to the lives of celebrities, seem
unlikely to play a large enough role in economic planning to compensate
for the harmful gambling they allow.60 This is likely the reason such
markets remain illegal in the United States and are instead based abroad.

58

See James Tobin, A Proposal for International Monetary Reform, 4 E. ECON. J. 153 (1978).
See ABRAMOWICZ, supra note 41, at 9–11 (comparing prediction markets and polls for
presidential elections).
60
The most famous prediction market was probably Intrade before it was shut down. See INTRADE,
http://www.intrade.com (last visited May 21, 2013).
59
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C. Examples
In this section, we use examples of actual derivatives to illustrate how
our proposed FPA would evaluate applications for approval of new
financial products. However, under our proposal all existing derivatives
would be grandfathered; thus, we do not actually argue that a new FPA
should evaluate these derivatives. The purpose of this discussion is
therefore illustrative only.
1. Life Insurance.—We begin with life insurance because this
financial product will be familiar to all readers and because it played an
important role in the development of insurance regulation and, more
broadly, financial products regulation. A breadwinner cares about the wellbeing of her spouse and knows that if she dies, her spouse’s income will
fall considerably. The breadwinner could save a portion of income in
anticipation of this event, but a cheaper approach is to buy life insurance,
which pays the spouse if and only if the breadwinner dies. Life insurance
increases the individual welfare of the insured61 and the beneficiary by
equalizing the beneficiaries’ wealth over differing states of the world. A
person is better off with the same income regardless of whether his spouse
lives or dies than with a high income if his spouse lives and a low income if
his spouse dies.
However, life insurance can also be abused to speculative ends. In
eighteenth-century England, people would buy life insurance on politicians
and other celebrities so that if the named person died, the purchaser of the
insurance would receive a payout.62 While in principle, people could in this
way insure against risks—for example, the risk of an economic crisis and
loss of one’s income if a statesman is assassinated—in practice people used
life insurance products to gamble. Gambling is a socially wasteful activity
because it increases the variance of one’s income rather than (as in the case
of insurance) reducing it. The law responded by developing the insurable
interest doctrine, which prohibited insurance policies written on people in
whom the buyer of the policy did not have a direct financial or emotional
interest.63
To understand how our proposal works, imagine that someone invents
life insurance and seeks approval from the FPA. The agency must first
ascertain the likely demand for life insurance for insurance purposes. First,
the agency would estimate the number of people in the jurisdiction who are
both breadwinners and have dependents, including spouses, children, and
elderly parents. These people can potentially benefit from the introduction
of life insurance through its insurance properties. The agency could go
61

Assuming that the insured is altruistic, which is normally the motivation for purchasing life
insurance as the buyer cannot directly enjoy the payout.
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CLARK, supra note 8, at 53.
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Id.
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further and estimate the actual aggregate value of life insurance by
determining how much these people are on average willing to pay for life
insurance given their next best option for insuring beneficiaries, which is
through savings. Life insurance is superior to bank deposits for protecting
dependents because life insurance frees up wealth for other consumption or
investment purposes. Thus, the benefit of life insurance is that it enables
breadwinners to provide protection to dependents at less cost than the nextbest mechanism of saving. A financial analyst can estimate the difference
in cost using standard algorithms and then roughly estimate the aggregate
social benefit by multiplying the number of breadwinners and the cost
savings per breadwinner. Any other possible benefits from life insurance
would also need to be estimated.
Second, the agency must estimate the potential costs of life insurance.
The main focus will be gambling. The worry is that people might use life
insurance to gamble on the lives of others, including celebrities and
politicians. This behavior does not reduce risk for dependents or anyone
else; it simply increases the risk or variance faced by the purchasers of life
insurance policies, as is always the case with gambling.64 Potentially, the
speculative cost could be very high. It is likely to be very difficult to
estimate how much speculative activity will take place. If so, the agency
could approve life insurance on a provisional basis and revisit its judgment
at a later date. At this point, the agency would determine how much
gambling takes place by demanding this information from life insurance
companies using its subpoena power. The agency could then ban life
insurance if (crudely) the number of speculative contracts exceeded the
number of insurance contracts or (better, but more difficult) the aggregate
loss of utility caused by the speculative contracts exceeded the aggregate
gain in utility caused by the insurance contracts.
Fortunately, there is (and was) a better way to regulate. The agency
could (and should) permit life insurance policies where an “insurable
interest” exists and forbid them where such an interest does not exist. An
insurable interest exists when the event that gives rise to the insurance
payout actually causes a utility loss.65 For example, beneficiaries have an
insurable interest in the death of the breadwinner because they will lose a
source of income.66 The insurable interest requirement ensures that the life
insurance is being used to insure risk (the payout occurs just when a loss is
incurred) and not to gamble (where the payout occurs even if no loss is
incurred).
64

We ignore traditional moral hazard concerns, namely, that life insurance policies of this type
give insurance owners an incentive to murder the insured person.
65
See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 83 (5th ed. 2010).
66
The law also recognizes insurable interests when there is a relationship of affection between the
person whose life is insured and the beneficiary. Id. at 84. We suspect this is just a proxy for a financial
interest.
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This approach could be extended to other derivatives. When the
agency is confronted with a derivative where there is both a lot of possible
gain and a lot of possible harm simultaneously and where (like with life
insurance) it is easy for a court ex post to gauge whether there was or was
not an insurable interest, the agency could approve the derivative subject to
the insurable interest requirement.
The agency would also consider the other factors that we have
identified. There is no reason to believe that life insurance can be used to
allocate capital in any significant way or to speed up transactions. Nor will
life insurance have significant positive informational externalities (although
conceivably a liquid life insurance market on important politicians could
produce valuable information). Accordingly, these factors would play no
role in the decision to approve life insurance.
However, it turns out that life insurance can be used for tax arbitrage.
Over the last several decades, a number of U.S. firms such as Wal-Mart
bought life insurance on their employees in order to obtain tax
advantages.67 Congress and the IRS have responded with various rules that
have limited, but not eliminated, the opportunities for tax arbitrage.68 While
it is highly unlikely that the tax arbitrage costs would justify a ban on life
insurance, the problems caused by arbitrage are an important reminder that
even clearly beneficial financial products create hidden social costs.
2. Mutual Funds.—The modern financial market replays at a higher
level of complexity the basic tradeoffs seen in the eighteenth-century life
insurance market. Some products can be used only for insurance and do not
serve speculative purposes. For example, one of the most important
financial innovations of the mid-twentieth century was the creation of
mutual funds, particularly mutual funds that closely tracked market indices.
Mutual funds are companies whose assets consist of portfolios of stocks or
other securities and sell shares in themselves to the public.69
Mutual funds created two major social benefits. First, they made more
capital available to firms and entrepreneurs. Before the advent of mutual
funds, many ordinary people stayed out of the stock and bond markets
because of the high costs of trading. In order to maintain a diversified
portfolio, one must frequently sell various securities (those that have
appreciated) and buy others (those whose value has declined). This is
costly and requires a great deal of attention. When an investor buys a share
of a mutual fund, by contrast, she effectively delegates these tasks to a
manager, who saves transaction costs because of economies of scale. When
67

See Susan Lorde Martin, Corporate-Owned Life Insurance: Another Financial Scheme that
Takes Advantage of Employees and Shareholders, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 653, 665−67 (2004).
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Id. at 666.
69
See Anand G. Shetty, Mutual Funds, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BUSINESS AND FINANCE 530–32
(2d ed. 2007).
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funds are designed to track an index of a group of assets, like the S&P 500,
the manager does little work and thus does not demand high compensation.
With more people contributing to the stock and bond markets, the cost of
capital for firms has declined. Mutual funds thus played a crucial role in
shifting the funding model for start-up companies from bank financing to
private equity financing with the possibility of exit to the stock market.
Because traditional bank loans provided excessive incentives for risk
taking,70 mutual funds and the growth of equity markets that they sparked
played a crucial role in the allocation of capital to entrepreneurs.71
Second and closely related, mutual funds also generated an important
but subtle insurance benefit.72 When investors buy shares of mutual funds,
they are actually increasing their exposure to risk (at least, if they were
using low-risk bank savings to buy the shares). But risk is reduced for the
owners of firms, who no longer need to rely as much on their own assets to
invest as capital markets expand. In aggregate, risk should decline simply
because the relevant risk (that a firm’s investment will go sour) is spread
across more people—all the ordinary investors in the general public rather
than just the firm’s owners and a few other investors. This is a classic
example of the insurance benefits of creating a more diversified and liquid
financial market that we discussed above.
Meanwhile, mutual funds, especially index funds, brought little if any
value to speculators or high-frequency traders. Shares were regulated so
that they could only be purchased by individuals. Speculators and highfrequency traders typically deal in large volumes and gain little from the
ability to buy a diversified portfolio at low transaction costs.73 Furthermore,
as Gorton and Pennacchi argue, mutual funds were also specifically
designed as investment vehicles for individuals and thus are unlikely to be
useful for institutions or speculators.74 All these features were apparent at
the birth of the mutual fund and much remarked upon even prior to such
funds being widely available.75
Mutual funds—and again we have in mind index funds in particular—
also create few opportunities for sophisticated investors to take advantage
of heuristics. When ordinary people put their savings in index funds, they
are not relying on any particular heuristics (like, buy a security whose value
70

The borrower enjoys the upside of the investment, while the downside is limited by bankruptcy;
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In fact, in our framework, these two benefits are just two sides of the insurance coin, but we treat
them separately for emphasis and clarity.
73
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See Gary B. Gorton & George G. Pennacchi, Security Baskets and Index-Linked Securities, 66 J.
BUS. 1, 24 (1993).
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has recently increased). In fact, financial theory teaches that optimal
investment portfolios for individuals should be widely diversified and
representative of the full set of possible investments, exactly what an index
fund aims (and was designed) to achieve.76
3. Credit Default Swaps.—CDSs are derivatives in which the seller
agrees to pay the buyer the value of an underlying bond if the issuer of that
bond defaults.77 For example, a CDS on a Greek sovereign bond would pay
its holder the value of the bond if the Greek government defaults on it. A
CDS is covered if the holder also owns the underlying bond. A CDS is
naked if the holder does not own the underlying bond.
A covered CDS cannot be used for gambling because its value is
negatively correlated with the value of the bond. But by the same token, it
is unattractive for investors. As Giglio points out, a CDS exposes the
individual to counterparty risk when she can acquire insurance against the
bond by selling it and purchasing a U.S. Treasury bond, which is zero
risk.78 As we explained earlier, CDSs are only useful as a way to avoid
having to hold substantial offsetting short and long positions on Treasuries
and the relevant bond to take speculative positions in these bonds. For this
purpose, only naked CDSs can be used. Thus, CDSs serve almost
exclusively as speculative devices or to promote high-frequency
transactions.
Furthermore, as Giglio points out, CDSs generated significant
“counterparty risk.”79 When an investment bank sells CDS protection, the
buyer is exposed to the risk that the bank will fail, in which case it will not
be compensated if the underlying bond defaults. Because of the reduced
cost associated with CDSs, arising from the lowered margin requirements,
many clients were willing to accept this risk to engage in gambling.
However, given that almost none of these clients were previously exposed
to the risk of their counterparty prospering, this counterparty risk became a
dangerous pitfall accompanying CDS positions.
Moreover, credit default swaps played little, if any, role in the
fundamental allocation of capital, as was clear from their inception.
Because they can only be used to take positions on bond or other credit
issues already outstanding, they do not play a role (as with mortgage or
junk bond bundling) in the placing of new bonds. On the other hand, as
discussed above, they can significantly reduce the cost of trading large
volumes of bets on existing credits, which have value primarily as a means
76

See BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET (rev. ed. 2011).
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of beating the market to judgments on the creditworthiness of a particular
issue. Thus, CDSs facilitated informational racing but little capital
allocation.
Some have argued that CDSs provided positive informational
externalities by revealing the creditworthiness of borrowers.80 However,
this argument is mistaken for two reasons. First, bond spreads over U.S.
Treasuries or other safe issues were always readily available measures of
creditworthiness, widely cited and used decades before CDSs entered the
markets.81 Second, the performance of spreads as predictors of credit events
has not obviously increased since the boom in CDSs.82 While Blanco,
Brennan, and Marsh find that CDSs tend to incorporate new information
about creditworthiness faster than do bond spreads, this may result simply
from substituting activity away from the bond market to the CDS market.83
In fact, Bai, Philippon, and Savov find more broadly that financial
innovation and the growth of the financial sector appear not to have
increased the quality of information about security and credit values.84
In fact, a CDS is a highly imperfect measure of creditworthiness
because its spread over the more basic risk-bond or safe-bond spread
represents not different information, but rather the probability of the
counterparty (that is, the party that issues the CDS) becoming distressed
and thus defaulting.85 Giglio argues that there may be some positive
informational externalities in clarifying the probability of such catastrophic
meltdowns of counterparties and the financial system.86 This argument is
persuasive because the CDS market could have (though appears not to
have) offered a telling sign to regulators about the market’s opinion about
the probability of systemic financial failure. The benefits of such
informational externalities would have to be judged against the other costs
of CDSs and would almost certainly not make up for them, given the
alternative sources of information about systemic risk, such as standard
bond spreads on financial institutions.87
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Bloink, supra note 10, at 631 (arguing that CDSs have positive information externalities in that
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If we imagined the CDS as being proposed for the first time by a
financial innovator, we would expect the FPA to treat it skeptically. A
complete ban on CDSs may be unwarranted because at least covered CDSs
cannot be used for speculative purposes (although their insurance benefits
are minimal as well). A reasonable approach would have been not to ban
all CDSs, but to ban only naked CDSs—in effect, applying the insurable
interest rule to this product.
4. Currency and Interest-Rate Swaps.—Currency and interest-rate
swaps are agreements between two parties for one to pay to the other the
net between the payments accruing on two different interest-bearing
products or groups of products.88 For example, parties might swap bonds of
similar maturities in two different currencies or swap a fixed-rate bond for
a series of short-term bonds starting at different dates that together span the
same maturity as the fixed-rate bond. In a common transaction between
banks, a party swaps interest payments due to it based on a floating rate for
interest payments due to another party based on a fixed rate, where the two
interest streams have the same expected value. This is a way for the first
party to reduce its exposure to risk and the second party to increase its
exposure to risk.
Interest-rate and currency swaps are very similar to their close cousin,
the CDS. While both may in principle be used for insurance, an investor
can accomplish such insurance just as easily by selling one of the
underlying fixed-income assets or currencies (the short side of the swap)
and purchasing the other (the long side). Thus, most swaps are “naked” and
intended to avoid the transaction costs of short selling to gamble on the
relevant products. These swaps are used primarily for speculating on
currencies or interest rates, both as pure bets and to evade various forms of
regulation, including currency controls and capital requirements differing
across different maturities of fixed income securities. Thus, traditional
swaps, like CDSs, tend to engender significant gambling with limited
insurance value.
While such gambling may help bring asset prices closer to their true
values, thereby encouraging correct borrowing and savings decisions, again
like CDSs, currency and interest-rate swaps do not allow entirely new
trades to occur. Instead, they increase the ease and accelerate the pace of
such transactions by reducing the necessity of short selling. Thus, such
swaps primarily encourage informational racing and high-frequency trading
rather than play an important role in the allocation of real capital.
Thus, the FPA, facing the introduction of swaps prospectively, would
likely have prohibited them in the same way it would have prohibited
Things Fall Apart: Regulating the Credit Default Swap Commons, 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 167, 202−06
(2011) (describing the costs of CDSs).
88
See AMIR SADR, INTEREST RATE SWAPS AND THEIR DERIVATIVES 25 (2009).
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CDSs. However, as with CDSs but with even greater history behind them,
swaps would be grandfathered because much of the harmful regulatory
arbitrage they permit is no longer possible because currency and capital
controls have adjusted to prohibit the use of swaps for their most abusive
purposes.
5. Equity Options.—Perhaps the canonical example of a derivative
security, and one of those with the longest history, is the equity option. A
call (put) option entitles the owner to purchase (sell) a stock at a given
strike price. Options date back thousands of years and in most forms have
obviously desirable economic properties. For example, the seller of a house
might give the buyer an option to purchase the house at a certain price; this
allows the buyer to invest in information about the house and neighborhood
without worrying that the house will be sold to someone else. Equity
options have a more recent vintage, and equity options exchanges go back
only to the 1970s, when the Chicago Board of Trade created the first
options exchange.89 While it may appear that equity options are an effective
way to insure risk associated with a stock, this is deceptive. One can always
insure the risk on a stock simply by selling the stock and investing the
proceeds in a (nearly) risk-free asset, such as Treasury bills.
Thus, the true exposure that options allow to be insured or gambled on
is more subtle and was not well understood until the pioneering work of
Black and Scholes and of Merton.90 Clearly, if an option is “in the money”
already (if it is already profitable to exercise the option), it has some value
simply mechanically. However, Black, Scholes, and Merton argued that the
option has an additional value determined by the uncertainty over the
movements of the underlying asset. This “option value” is related by a
somewhat complex mathematical equation to the time remaining on the
option and the uncertainty about its movements, but crucially, if the degree
of uncertainty (or volatility) of the movements of the underlying asset is
known, then the option value can be calculated mathematically. Thus, the
only risk an option could insure, or bet the option would allow taking, is
related to the volatility of the underlying asset rather than its actual value.
Except for risks created by options themselves, individuals and firms
rarely, if ever, face risk related to the level of volatility of an asset rather
than the value of the asset itself. Thus, options do not appear to play a
significant insurance role. Instead, options are a classic example of a
primarily speculative instrument. Options have been used to undertake a
variety of types of harmful arbitrage: of heuristics, taxes, and capital
regulations. Many firms during the 1990s used stock options as a form of
89
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compensation for executives because their value was less clearly known
and thus it was possible to raise pay in a less transparent fashion.91 Because
options can be used to gain or insure an exposure to a stock’s value without
purchasing or selling it, options have been extensively used to arbitrage tax
regulations distinguishing the treatment of capital and interest income.92
Until capital adequacy regulations were adjusted to properly account for
the risk exposure created by options in the transition from Basel I to Basel
II, options offered an attractive way for firms to take positions in the
market without committing the capital that would usually be requisite.93
Thus, options offer a perfect example of a harmful existing innovation.
However, they also offer a clear case of why new innovations may be more
dangerous than existing products that may have been harmful when they
were themselves new. Options are now used much less frequently to
reward executives (compared to standard stock grants) because it is well
understood that they are used to game the system.94 Tax regulations have
successfully closed loopholes created by the treatment of options.95 And
capital adequacy regulations have similarly eliminated advantages to using
options. Even pure disagreement-based gambling has declined as clearer
mathematical models of option pricing have led to more precise estimates
of option values on which different market participants used to disagree
significantly.96
Thus, while the FPA would likely have prohibited options
prospectively, the fact that it would not now ban them ex post is not likely
to undermine efficient market functioning too severely. In fact, at this
point, the positive informational externalities of being able to determine
market volatility (information often used by policymakers at the Federal
Reserve) may outweigh the remaining harms created by gambling on
options. As a result, we believe that the highest priority is to avoid the
future creation of more derivatives, to which the market has not yet
adjusted and which will therefore fuel harmful gambling, rather than to
restrict the use of existing products.
6. Statistical Derivatives.—A class of financial products sometimes
referred to as statistical derivatives are based on properties of the
distribution of asset returns, such as their volatility and correlation (across
different assets), related to those that determine option value. Volatility
derivatives pay off based on the average daily volatility of a stock or index
91
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over a period, as measured by the variance of daily stock movements.
Correlation swaps pay off based on various measures of correlation
between the movements of stocks in a cluster (usually an index) over a
period. For example, a common correlation derivative is based on the
average pairwise correlation in daily stock movements over a period, such
as a month. The derivative pays off if the stock values are correlated.97
Most popular are instruments that allow the taking of positions on the
correlation structure of debt defaults, Collateralized Debt Obligations
(CDOs), including the infamous CDOs of Asset-Backed Securities.98 A
CDO is a financial instrument constructed from underlying bonds. The
income streams from these bonds are combined and securitized according
to various tranches or categories (e.g., mezzanine, equity, and debt), where
investors who hold bonds based on the higher tranches are paid before
investors who hold bonds based on the lower tranches. When the value of
the underlying bonds are relatively uncorrelated, the risk to owners of the
higher tranches is very limited—they receive nothing only if all or nearly
all of the underlying bonds default because if only a few bonds default, the
loss is absorbed by owners of the lower tranches. However, if all of the
underlying bonds default at the same time, that is, if they are highly
correlated, then the high tranches may be wiped out, even though they
received limited compensation for this risk. Thus, by taking offsetting
positions in different tranches, investors are able to gain exposure to or
against the correlation between these debt defaults, which was not possible
previously, when assets were simply packaged together and sold as a
whole.
These instruments appear to play a few roles in the markets. First,
many hedge funds extensively model the statistical properties of assets in
order to price options and other preexisting derivatives and thus believe
they have expertise on these.99 They use bets on these exotic derivatives to
take positions directly in these properties, either for insurance or
speculative purposes. Second, investment banks have created structured
products that imbed these properties and sell them to consumers.100 It seems
to be easy to market such positions to consumers because they appear to
remove various components of risk that Taleb shows investors tend to
overweight in some cases (the risk of small fluctuations of individual
stocks) and underweight in others (the risk of systemic disaster).101 Third,
97
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investment banks and hedge funds create products that satisfy various rules
used to determine credit ratings for assets in ways that do not require
actually reducing the relevant-to-investor risks. This led to large amounts
of AAA-rated paper being churned out of CDOs despite this paper being
highly systemically risky.102 That is, these derivatives are extremely useful
for regulatory and evaluator arbitrage. Finally, sophisticated financial
institutions use these products to engage in tax arbitrage in a similar
manner.103
On the other hand, it appears that no financial institution or individual
was, prior to the introduction of these derivatives, exposed to significant
risk associated with the statistical properties, except those acquired through
gambling on options. They also play little role in the allocation of capital
because no investment decisions are based on the volatility of existing asset
pricing and at best contribute to a limited extent to the informational
efficiency of asset price levels that spur capital allocation because they are
not directly related to the value of particular firm or sectoral investments.
However, they have the potential to produce some positive informational
externalities because volatility and correlation may have some predictive
power regarding the direction of macroeconomic aggregates that may affect
firm or policymaker decisionmaking.
In sum, given the numerous and clearly identifiable harmful uses and
the tightly limited upside, it seems clear that a well-run agency would have
rejected the introduction of such derivatives had they been proposed for
approval.
7. Derivatives Based on National Income.—Shiller proposed the
introduction of a small number (one or two) of derivative securities based
on a weighted average (possibly negatively in some countries) of the GDP
growth of the fifty-four countries in the Penn World Table Mark 5.5.104
That is, the derivatives were to pay out when the GDP of some countries
rose and to lose value when the GDP of others fell. He argued that such
derivatives would offer useful insurance to individuals living in many
countries because the income individuals earn at work and their chance of
retaining their jobs depends crucially on the state of their respective
national economies.
To estimate the potential gains from insurance of introducing these
securities, Athanasoulis and Shiller calculated the extent to which the
riskiness of countries’ income would be reduced as a result of the
introduction of these securities based on more than forty years of GDP
102
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data.105 Using a standard economic model of optimal risk–return trade-offs,
and assuming that everyone in a given country is identical, they calculated
that Americans could gain roughly $400 per capita by the reduction in the
uncertainty about their income from insurance.106
However, Simsek notes that individuals with different beliefs could
also use these derivatives to gamble on national income prospects.107 To
calibrate this effect, Simsek considers a survey of professional forecasters
by the Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank. He assumes that the variance of
beliefs about GDP among these forecasters is similar to that between
individuals participating in the markets. These beliefs, in fact, widely differ
across individuals.108 He thus calculates that if individuals engage in their
optimal portfolio selection, given their beliefs, risk dramatically expands
and the negative consequences of gambling swamp any gains from
insurance and lead to thousands of dollars of lost welfare per capita.109 In
fact, even if views among the public were an order of magnitude less
dispersed than those among the forecasters, gambling would still outweigh
insurance benefits.110 Thus Simsek’s simple pass at the analysis we propose
would lead to clear rejection of these derivatives. Furthermore, and
revealingly, Simsek shows that given this spread of beliefs, the most
profitable securities would not be the ones Athanasoulis and Shiller
propose but rather others that would facilitate even greater gambling and
would fail our test more severely.111
Of course, this analysis is extremely primitive and could be improved
along a number of dimensions. An agency should use micro-level data to
account for the possibility that different individuals in a given country are
differently exposed to national income risk. It might also consider the
interactions of the derivatives with taxes, regulations, and investor
heuristics to consider arbitrage-inspired gambling. Surveys of investors
rather than forecasters would be ideal. However, the Simsek analysis shows
clearly how a very simple calculation based on coarse, publicly available
data and textbook economic models can make a strong prima facie case
against a new financial product, which then could be potentially rebutted
or, if not, could form the basis of a case for prohibition or tight restrictions
on marketing.
However, national income-based derivatives seem likely to bring
significant benefits and little harm outside of the realm of the core
insurance–gambling trade-off. In terms of the allocation of capital, national
105
106
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109
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income derivatives have the potential to begin the process of opening
equity markets for the funding of national governments. Ultimately,
countries may be able to sell shares of their future tax revenue (or closely
related, their GDP) as equity. The sale of these shares may offer safer and
more stable means of government finance than sovereign debt does, though
derivatives based on national tax revenues rather than incomes may be
more directly useful for this purpose. Derivatives based on national income
also seem to have some of the clearest potential to yield valuable
information to policymakers and businesses, given the importance of
aggregate national income for a variety of planning. While national income
derivatives could become a base for informational racing, they offer an
entirely new arena for finance rather than simply allow acceleration of
existing asset trades. Thus they do not seem clearly designed to accelerate
the speed of trading even if they may have some potential side effects in
this direction.
The bottom line is that national income derivatives would be a close
run case for the agency, with strong arguments on each side. As is usual for
such close cases, one cannot have great confidence that the agency would
decide correctly, but the costs of an incorrect decision would also likely be
low on net. Presumably as the agency gains experience, develops more
detailed models, and draws on growing research stimulated by its
operation, its ability to clearly adjudicate close calls would improve.
8. Real Estate Derivatives.—Another proposed derivative turns on
the performance of the real estate market. Case, Shiller, and Weiss
proposed the creation of securities based on the value of indices of real
estate prices in different regions of the country.112 They reasoned that such
derivatives would offer substantial opportunities for insurance, on both
sides of the market, not currently available. Home owners and mortgagegranting banks cannot offload the risk associated with each individual
house price directly by selling the house or mortgage on it to other
individuals because this undermines incentives for taking care of the
home113 or screening loan applicants.114 Thus, insurance is feasible only if
indices of local home prices, over which individuals or firms have no direct
control, can be used for insurance rather than the price of the individual
home. However, McDuff shows that even quite coarse, regional indices
explain a large part of the variation in prices of individual houses, and thus
112
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securities based on regional home price indices can provide significant
insurance opportunities for home and mortgage owners.115 On the other side
of the market, many current renters face risk associated with house prices
rising, thus pricing them out of the market for the future. Thus, real estate
derivatives seem to offer substantial potential for social benefits.
They work like this. The derivative is linked to an index composed of
a random sample of house prices from a region in which a person lives over
a period. If house prices rise, the owner of the derivative sells the derivative
and realizes capital gains; if house prices fall, a person who has shorted the
derivative can liquidate her position and also obtain profits. In theory, a
homeowner would want to be short on the derivative on her regional index
and go long on derivatives for other regions where she might move. Thus,
if the price of her house falls, she receives a payoff that offsets the losses
she has presumably taken on her own house, and if it rises, she takes a loss
presumably offsetting the rise in the value of her home. If housing in the
region she may move to rises in price, she receives a payoff that partly
compensates for the higher prices she is likely to have to pay for housing in
the future; if it falls, she takes a loss partly offsetting the fall in housing
costs she will face in the future. A renter would just do the long part. This
would create a liquid market in these assets, and the payments would not be
made bilaterally but rather based on how the index moved, plus whatever
premium was necessary to make the market clear between the two sides.
On the other hand, it is possible that such indices could become
vehicles for gambling. No obvious tax, heuristic, or regulatory arbitrage
opportunities present themselves, but disagreements about the value of real
estate were rampant, especially during the real estate bubble of the 2000s,116
and thus, it seems possible that securities intended as insurance could end
up instead being used by individuals with a view on the direction of the
market, which could well increase their risk. For example, a homeowner
bullish on the housing market seems just as likely to use the market to
increase as to hedge her exposure to house prices. On the other hand, large
preexisting vehicles for speculating on real estate nationwide already exist
in the form of securitized mortgage debt and real estate equity funds. Thus,
the primary additional area for gambling opened by these derivatives is that
area related to particular regional markets. It thus seems likely that while
real estate derivatives could in principle stimulate gambling, overall their
net benefits on the insurance versus gambling dimension are positive.
Furthermore, were real estate derivatives to become widespread, they
might have an important effect on the real allocation of capital. Costs of
insuring home prices, were such index-based insurance to become the
norm, could help check purchaser expectations about continually rising
115
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home prices and thus make a bubble less likely in an asset class that is
notoriously difficult to sell short. Given the illiquid nature of housing
derivatives, at least initially, it seems unlikely that they would fuel a market
sufficiently vigorous to be the source of a large amount of informational
racing. Finally, the externalities created by the existence of projections of
regional house prices could be substantial because real estate bubbles are
an important concern of fiscal, monetary, and regulatory policymakers.
Thus, it seems very likely that the FPA would have approved real estate
derivatives.
In fact, these derivatives were created as the S&P Case–Shiller Index
Housing Derivatives and listed on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (now
the Chicago Board of Trade) in 2006.117 As Shiller reports, the market
largely flopped, generating only a total of $612 million in total positions
over the course of the following year and a half; the market has further
declined in size since then.118 Thus, in reality, the Case–Shiller derivatives
appear to have ended up having neither the benefits nor the costs that could
have been projected ahead of time. This is an example of why important
factors determining the impact of derivatives (the quality of marketing,
infrastructure, etc.) can affect their eventual impact in ways that are
difficult to predict. Nonetheless, Shiller reports information on who
purchased contracts that indicates that its impact, while small, appears to
have been net positive. Thus, while the projections on both the positive and
negative size of this derivative would have been overblown, it seems that
the direction of the decision would likely have been correct.
9. Commodities Futures Markets.—Futures contracts allow two
parties to agree to exchange a commodity at a future date according to
standardized terms. Futures contracts have their history in and most
common application to commodity markets, particularly agriculture and
energy. They are one of the oldest forms of insurance. Although there were
predecessors in other countries, the modern futures market in the United
States was developed in Chicago in the mid-nineteenth century to address
agricultural commodities like pork bellies.119 In a futures contract, the seller
agrees to deliver a certain quantity of a certain standardized commodity at a
certain future date in return for a fixed payment. A farmer could therefore
be assured of the price he or she would be paid at the time of planting and
117
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so could avoid over- or underplanting, while a wholesaler could be assured
of the price it would pay at the time of delivery and so could avoid over- or
underinvesting in transportation, storage, and so forth. In this way, the
seller insures against a price decline, the buyer insures against a price rise,
and total risk exposure is reduced.
Futures also can be a means for gambling. Futures exchanges, like the
famous Chicago Mercantile Exchange, have long hosted large numbers of
speculators not directly involved in either consumption or production who
participate in these markets.120 However, a large fraction even of these
speculators are involved in the market in some physical capacity. Many
take advantage of the fact that many of the commodities can be stored. If
the intertemporal pattern of prices reflected in the market diverges from the
costs of storage net of interest, these speculators store the commodity (or
run down stores) to keep prices in line. While such behavior may seem
speculative, it affects the real allocation of economic resources and
therefore is socially beneficial.
In fact, Adam Smith wrote in The Wealth of Nations:
By making [the great body of the people] feel the inconveniencies of a dearth
somewhat earlier than they otherwise might do, [a futures speculator] prevents
their feeling them afterwards so severely as they certainly would do, if the
cheapness of price encouraged them to consume faster than suited the real
scarcity of the season. When the scarcity is real, the best thing that can be
done for the people is to divide the inconveniencies of it as equally as possible
through all the different months, and weeks, and days of the year. The interest
of the corn merchant makes him study to do this as exactly as he can . . . .121

Thus, futures markets play a crucial role in the allocation of real economic
resources, analogous to the allocation of capital motive we highlight. They
also influence commodity producers’ planning and investment decisions,
having additional follow-on effects on the allocation of real resources.
Futures markets are deliberately designed to increase the speed and
ease with which expected future prices can be incorporated into the
operation of markets and thus clearly accelerate the speed of trade.
However, unlike in other markets such as purely financial markets, this
additional speed may actually be warranted by the impacts it has on
economic activity. While companies’ financing decisions are taken
relatively infrequently and thus feedback from price signals over short time
ranges is not very important, decisions about commodities investment,
storage, and consumption are made by large numbers of individuals. This
means that at any moment in time, some individual is likely to be making a
relevant decision affecting the real economy. Thus, up-to-date price signals
120
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are much more valuable in commodities futures markets than in other
markets. Additionally, the information created by these prices typically has
important beneficial spillovers as well because many governments
intervene in commodities markets and need projections of the future of
these markets to plan effectively.
Thus, it seems clear that whatever the harms from gambling in
commodities futures markets, an FPA would be very likely to approve
them were the issue to come up anew.
D. Relationship with the Insurable Interest Rule and the Law
Against Wagering
1. The Insurable Interest Rule.—As noted in the discussion of life
insurance, a useful strategy for regulation is to approve financial products
on the basis of the insurable interest requirement: the owner or beneficiary
of the product receives a financial payout if and only if she incurs a loss of
some sort. The payout could be explicitly contingent on the loss, as in the
case of a conventional life insurance policy or a covered CDS. Or it could
be merely correlated with the loss. The insurable interest rule is a powerful
method for restricting gambling while permitting insurance.
It should therefore not be surprising that the insurable interest rule has
been in existence for more than two hundred years.122 However, it has had
less influence on U.S. financial markets than it should have had for two
reasons. First, there has been a great deal of uncertainty about the scope of
the insurable interest requirement. Second, there has been some
controversy over the policy basis of the insurable interest requirement.
The scope problem arises because virtually all financial transactions
transfer risk, and yet no one wants to believe that all financial transactions
are insurance policies. At the very least, such a view would cause
regulatory havoc. It implies that state insurance agencies would have
jurisdiction over virtually all financial products—when it is generally
understood that there needs to be a division of labor between the state
insurance agencies and federal securities agencies like the SEC and the
CFTC, and that state insurance agencies have no expertise over financial
products other than conventional insurance policies. To avoid regulatory
overlap, state insurance agencies have limited their jurisdiction to
conventional insurance policies issued by traditional insurance companies
and avoided defining financial derivatives as “insurance.” Famously, the
New York insurance agency refused to regulate CDSs in 2000.123
But the regulatory division of labor and the insurable interest rule
should not be confused. Even if we want state insurance agencies to
122
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regulate only conventional insurance companies that serve consumers and
businesses, it does not follow that the insurable interest rule should not be
applied to financial products. What follows is just that some other agency,
such as our proposed FPA, should apply the rule to financial products.
The policy controversy concerns whether the basis of the insurable
interest is moral hazard, gambling, or something else. The traditional policy
basis was a combination of moral hazard concerns and gambling. The
moral hazard argument is that if a person can buy insurance on the life of a
person or the existence of an object in which she has no financial interest,
then she will have an incentive to kill that person or destroy the object (for
example, burn down a building on which she owns insurance). The moral
hazard argument is problematic.124 Insurance companies bear some of the
cost of moral hazard, so they have strong incentives to deter it—for
example, simply by refusing to issue insurance when there is no insurable
interest or imposing deductibles or other restrictions. Recently, related
concerns have arisen over the CDS market. Some commentators believe
that holders of naked CDSs on Greek bonds have an incentive to block
efforts to rescue Greece because they receive their payoff if the Greek
bonds default.125 To the extent that CDSs end up in the hands of politically
influential entities, they could cause serious harm to negotiations.
However, this fear appears to be speculative at the current time.
The gambling argument has always played a subordinate role in policy
debates.126 The reason is probably that economists presume that
sophisticated parties should be free to enter any transactions that they want
to enter unless the transactions produce externalities, and gambling does
not (unless it increases systemic risk). Other concerns—for example, that it
is immoral to bet on another person’s life or property—seem antiquated.
However, as we have shown, the gambling problem is real and can be
given a solid founding in economic theory. Products that increase risk
exposure should be presumptively illegal. Thus, a revival of the insurable
interest requirement would improve social welfare.
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2. The Rule Against Wagering.—A related rule is the common law
restriction on wagering contracts. All states have statutes that ban or
heavily regulate gambling, and the courts have inferred a general public
policy against gambling or wager contracts.127 However, even as they were
developing this rule, courts quickly discovered that distinguishing a wager
from a legitimate contract is difficult to do. One early thought that was
quickly dismissed was that any contract that involved risk was a wager
contract.128 For example, a contract that paid off if the coin came out heads
would be invalid because the probability of heads is less than one.
However, virtually all contracts involve risk of this type; certainly, all
legitimate insurance contracts do, as does any sale of goods where, for
example, there is a nonzero probability that the goods will be destroyed in
transit or contain some defect.
Courts quickly realized that an identical contract could be used for
gambling or legitimate insurance purposes. The standard example is the
farmer who plants today and then expects to harvest a good crop if the
weather is good and a bad crop if the weather is bad. To protect himself
against the risk, the farmer enters a forward or futures contract where the
price of the crop is guaranteed. The price of the contract will reflect the
risk; the buyer agrees to a relatively high price minus a discount that
reflects the risk of the bad outcome. This contract serves as insurance
because it reduces the variance in payoffs for the farmer. Meanwhile, the
buyer could protect itself from risk by entering contracts with farmers in
multiple locations unlikely to experience the same weather.
Yet the exact same contract could be used for betting. Suppose that the
probability of the good outcome is one-half and the probability of the bad
outcome is one-half. Two gamblers could enter a futures contract to gamble
on the outcome. What makes their contract a gamble rather than insurance
is that the contract exposes them to more risk rather than less—and the
reason for this is that the payoff is not correlated with the bad outcome, as
it is for the farmer (who receives a payoff if and only if his crop is
destroyed). The crucial point to understand is that a court cannot
distinguish an insurance contract from a gambling contract merely by
inspecting the contract’s terms; it must also know the portfolios of the
parties and the relationship between the risk embodied in the contract and
the risk exposure in the portfolios.
Courts did not appear to understand this problem. Instead, they kept
inventing vaporous doctrinal formulations to help them distinguish
gambling and insurance transactions. For example, a contract would be
deemed a gambling contract if the parties intended to gamble, acted in bad
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faith, or did not have a legitimate interest.129 None of these gambits worked
because, as Kreitner notes, a legitimate contract and a gambling contract
are formally or analytically indistinguishable.130 Kreitner seems to argue
that there really was no difference between insurance and gambling
contracts and that the courts simply expressed the public’s ambivalence
toward capitalism (our “love/hate relationship with risk”131). Many other
authors seem to take the same view.132 But as we argued in Part I.A, there is
a crisp analytic difference between a transaction that increases the parties’
aggregate risk exposure and a transaction that does not increase the parties’
aggregate risk exposure. The courts seem to have grasped the basic
distinction between increasing risk and reducing risk but did not realize that
to apply this distinction to the cases, they could not limit themselves to an
evaluation of the contract but had to examine the financial holdings of the
parties as well.133 Perhaps some courts did realize this but believed that
such a standard would be unworkable. Or perhaps they believed that the
newly created regulatory agencies of the New Deal could handle the
problem more effectively. In any event, as the twentieth century
progressed, courts gradually stopped holding that financial transactions
violated the public policy against gambling.
3. Ex Post Versus Ex Ante Regulation.—The insurable interest rule
and the ban on wagering contracts are ex post rules. Parties can enter any
contract they want, but when one party breaches and the other party seeks
to enforce the contract in a court, the court will then apply the rule and
either void the contract or supply the victim with another remedy. We
advocate instead an ex ante system, where financial innovators must obtain
the approval of an agency before selling new products. In some cases, the
agency will simply do a cost–benefit analysis and ban a product if the
speculative costs exceed the insurance benefits. In other cases, the agency
might determine that the product should be permitted subject to
conditions—for example, that it be sold only to those with an insurable
interest. We provide more details in Part II, but what is important to
understand is that the underlying theory for the insurable interest rule, the
ban on wagering contracts, and our proposed form of ex ante regulation is
the same. The difference lies in the institutionalization or legal application
of the theory.
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II. AN FDA FOR THE FINANCIAL MARKET
A. Structure of the Financial Products Agency
We now turn to the question of how our approach could be
institutionalized. We propose a regulatory agency, the FPA, which would
be the FDA of financial derivatives. The inventor of a financial product
will not be able to sell it to the public without first submitting an
application to the FPA and receiving approval. The FPA will evaluate the
product using the test that we described above. The agency will approve,
reject, or approve the project subject to certain conditions. For example, as
noted, the agency might in close cases permit the inventor to sell the
product only where the product serves an insurable interest of the buyer. If
the inventor sells the product to buyers without insurable interests, then the
contract will be unenforceable in court. Such a course would be particularly
attractive not only when cases were close, but especially when
determination of whether an insurable interest exists ex post is particularly
feasible, as with life insurance or swap contracts as discussed above. The
inventor and others will then be able to market an approved product subject
to the conditions, if any. Anyone who markets a product without regulatory
approval will be subject to legal sanctions, and the contract that embodies
the product will not be enforceable in court.
Numerous legal and institutional issues would need to be addressed,
including how independent the agency should be, whether the agency
should have the power to issue binding rules, whether it should contain
adjudicatory mechanisms, the extent of judicial review, and so forth. These
are standard questions of administrative law that we will leave for others or
for future work because of their complexity.134
There are two useful analogies for the FPA. The first is review of new
pharmaceuticals by the Food and Drug Administration. Manufacturers must
submit applications to the FDA and obtain approval before marketing new
drugs.135 The major portion of the review process involves expensive and
time-consuming randomized clinical studies. This approach provides a
model for the review of financial innovations; however, the analysis of
proposed financial products should be much cheaper and quicker because it
will rely on existing publicly available data and will involve relatively
mechanical number crunching in most instances.
Particularly along this dimension (the cost, length, and nature of the
approval analytics process), the FPA would be more similar to a second
precedent: the review of proposed mergers by the Department of Justice
and the Federal Trade Commission. When two firms seek to merge, they
134
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must give notice to one of these agencies.136 The relevant agency then
evaluates the proposed merger using a test embodied in the Horizontal
Merger Guidelines.137 The test requires the agency to balance any
anticompetitive effects resulting from the increase in market power of the
merged entity against any efficiency benefits resulting from economies of
scale or other synergies. Like in our approach to financial innovation,
applicants must obtain ex ante approval from government agencies by
satisfying a test that combines quantitative and qualitative factors. The
main difference is that a merger is a one-shot contract; unlike a financial
innovation, it does not involve the creation of intellectual property. Also,
the primary justification for regulating new financial products is the direct
harm they cause to their consumers, as with medicine, rather than the
externalities they cause, as with mergers.
B. Parallels Between Pharmaceutical and Financial Products Regulation
Commentators have criticized the FDA process138 and the mergerapproval process,139 but there has been little effort to abolish them,
suggesting that the consensus is that these screening mechanisms are
socially desirable even if they can be improved along the margins.
Nonetheless, it is clear that they are exceptional. Most other products and
commercial decisions in American society are not under such rigorous
control: while the government may occasionally inspect for safety, test
properties of products, and allow lawsuits if harms occur, pre-approval of
new products is uncommon outside of medicine. The question thus arises
why financial innovation is more like pharmaceutical innovation than like
other products of the U.S. economy. There are a number of answers.
1. Subjective Preferences and Expertise.—The best medicine for an
individual to take is not something highly idiosyncratic to that individual,
conditional on her observable symptoms. While different individuals
usually respond differently to different treatments, this reaction is usually
as unpredictable to the individual as it is to the doctor treating her or to
anyone else prior to the treatment being administered. Thus the key
consideration in determining the appropriate medicine is usually the use of
the medical community’s expertise to determine the objectively best
treatment for the patient rather than the treatment that she subjectively
136
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prefers. Not only do individuals usually consult doctors about the best
medicine; doctors usually base their opinions on centrally conducted
research.
These features of the market for medicine contrast sharply with those
of most consumer products. When shopping for TVs, computers, or books,
individuals usually know far more about their tastes than any expert would
be capable of learning in any reasonable period of time. This capability
makes allowing individual choice and providing individuals with richly
detailed information (rather than a blunt permission or prohibition) far
more important in most product markets than in health. And it makes
access to expert advice much more important in health than in other
product markets.
Economic theory teaches us that finance is much like medicine.
Individuals’ optimal investment portfolios differ between individuals
relatively little, except in ways that can be readily observed and described
based on a small number of individual characteristics. These characteristics
include risk preferences, age, the industry in which one is employed, and
where one lives.140 On the other hand, optimal financial planning is a
complicated computational problem that is at the frontiers of both
economic theory and computer science.141 The vast majority of the well-off
seek advice about the allocation of their financial assets but rarely do so
about other life decisions.
2. Delayed and Uncertain Feedback.—A classic mechanism that
corrects poor decisionmaking in many settings and that actually allows
individuals to learn far more about their settings than experts can is prompt
and clear feedback about their success or failure. This has been
demonstrated in a wide range of economic and psychological
experiments.142 An important problem in medicine is that such feedback
often comes with long delays and is often garbled by uncertain outcomes
and placebo effects. Medicines that are inefficacious often do not show
themselves to be so until the medication has been used for a long period,
and efficacious medicines are often only effective on a small number of
patients. Medicines can often have subtle but corrosive long-term side
effects or may only have negative side effects with small probability.
Therefore, whether on net the medicine is worth it is something that
requires detailed scientific analysis, as is forced by the clinical trials
required for FDA approval. Such settings are ideal for ex ante agency
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regulation rather than tort remedies because victims do not learn of the
harm until it is too late.143
This delayed and uncertain feedback is actually far more prevalent in
finance. While most medicines usually yield some results within a year or
two, many financial instruments do not show their underlying frailty until a
once-in-a-lifetime financial crisis hits. Many ex ante sensible investments
turn sour and many ex ante ludicrous investments prosper, at least for some
period. Thus individuals can persist in making poor investment decisions
for very long periods without receiving clear feedback about this.
3. Extent of Potential Danger.—If you buy the wrong food, you may
get sick, and if you buy the wrong cell phone, you may face a serious
disruption to your work life. But the potency of medicines tends to mean
that making the wrong decision has a very severe left tail that, while it may
be relatively low probability, can be devastating in the case it occurs. This
makes extensive testing to ensure such outcomes are avoided crucial in
medicine. As Americans discovered during the recent financial crisis,
financial markets can have severe negative effects not just for individuals
but for whole societies. Thus the dangers of financial products seem at least
as extreme as the dangers of medicines.
C. Criticisms and Qualifications
Our proposal is not a panacea. We acknowledge that any new form of
regulation is not to be undertaken lightly. Agencies often make mistakes,
interfere with markets, and slow down innovation, and they can be captured
by interest groups. In this section, we anticipate and respond to some
objections.
1. Delay and Bureaucratic Risk Aversion.—Critics of the FDA argue
that it imposes unnecessary delays on the marketing of drugs, driven in part
by bureaucratic risk aversion—FDA officials will be hauled before
Congress if they wrongly approve a drug that causes death or severe side
effects, but not if they excessively slow down approval even when the
social costs of doing so are greater than the risks.144 As a result, the FDA
relies too much on extremely rigorous clinical tests and not enough on
other forms of research. We do not know whether this criticism is accurate,
but even if it is, we believe that bureaucratic risk aversion poses less of a
threat to financial innovation than it does to pharmaceutical innovation.
There are two reasons for this. First, despite the terrible effects of
dangerous financial products, their harms are not as vivid as birth defects or
premature deaths, so the publicity value of grilling errant regulators will be
lower. Second, we believe that the benefit of additional financial
143
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innovation is less than the benefit of additional pharmaceutical innovation
because it is already possible to use financial products to insure quite
efficiently, and market participants are wary about adopting even beneficial
financial products. Accordingly, even the most promising recent financial
innovations, such as the Case–Shiller housing derivatives, have met with
limited market demand, as discussed above.145 Thus, the cost of false
negatives is lower.
2. Agency Capture.—Another theory of government or agency
failure is the opposite: that far from being risk averse and eager to avoid
public controversies, agency officials are eager to use regulation to benefit
the regulated industry, a phenomenon known as agency capture.146 Many
critics of financial regulation have used capture theory to explain why they
oppose regulation; they fear that if regulators are given more power, they
will use it to protect the financial industry from competition rather than
protect investors from the financial industry.147 But although capture
theorists can point to specific examples where regulators misused this
authority in this way, as a general theory of regulation it is overdrawn. It
would justify eliminating all government agencies (including, say, the
military), and it is hard to reconcile with the obvious fact that most of the
time, industry opposes rather than welcomes the creation of new regulatory
bodies. Certainly, Dodd–Frank has not received much enthusiasm from the
financial industry.148 Furthermore, because most new financial products
open new markets rather than compete directly with existing products, it
seems less likely that industry groups will try to exploit the agency to shut
down competition. Such claims are rarely made about the FDA, for
example, compared with other regulatory agencies in industries where
entry of close competitors, rather than new products, is monitored.
3. Line-Drawing Problems and Issues of Generality.—Possibly the
most difficult problem is defining a “financial product” for the purpose of
review.149 Consider, for example, the CDS. Would the inventor of the first
145
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CDS have been required to obtain approval, or only the inventor of the first
naked CDS, or the inventor of the first naked CDS to be used to insure
against sovereign bonds, or just Greek bonds? Our tentative view is that the
inventor of the initial CDS should be required to obtain agency approval. In
the case of a financial product with many potential uses, the agency may
determine that it will be approved only for certain uses (akin to the
approval of new pharmaceuticals). The inventor or subsequent inventors
may then seek approval for more specialized uses based on additional data
or changes in market conditions.
A related problem could arise if investors choose to evade an FPA’s
restrictions on a particular financial product by customizing a one-shot
transaction that is functionally identical or closely related to the banned
product. This is, however, a generic problem in financial regulation, and
not a new one. The FPA and courts would need to do an ex post functional
analysis to determine whether the parties evaded the law through the
manipulation of legal forms or had an independent and valid economic
reason to enter into the transaction. Even if such adjudication is imperfect,
preventing abusive products from being cheap and standardized would
significantly raise the cost of using them and thus their prevalence.
One elegant solution to this problem would be to deprive the agency of
the power to block financial products and instead give it the power only to
license financial products. A financial innovator would be free to market a
product without prior authorization, but state anti-wager and insurable
interest laws would apply, and so subsequently a party could avoid
enforcement of any contract where the financial product was used to
gamble rather than to insure. To avoid the legal uncertainty, a financial
innovator could apply to the FPA for a license or no-action letter that stated
that the financial product satisfied our social welfare test and thus was
lawful. A licensed financial product would be immune to challenge in
court. Under this approach, people would (in theory) refuse to use financial
products for gambling purposes because they could not enforce their
payouts, while financial products mainly used for insurance purposes
would be unaffected.
4. Failures of Expertise.—A frequent complaint is that agencies
cannot attract the top talent and as a result are unable to understand and
regulate the products under their jurisdiction. This criticism is overdrawn.
Many agencies—including the FDA, the Justice Department, and the Fed—
have attracted top talent and can also contract out for it by paying
consultants. Furthermore, requiring pre-approval will provide firms seeking
approval an incentive to hire experts to provide the market research
necessary to establish the value of a product as happens extensively in both
merger and new pharmaceutical review, thus reducing the evaluative
burdens on the agency. The FPA would, of course, though, need to be
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designed like the FDA or the Fed so that its officials are adequately
compensated.
5. The Regulation of Existing Products.—The statute that created the
FDA grandfathered existing drugs; we would be tempted to do the same. It
would be arguably too difficult for a financial products agency to review
every financial instrument that exists. Critics might argue that we would
therefore fail to regulate many of the financial products that contributed to
the 2008 crisis, including our bête noire, the naked CDS. Nonetheless, new
products are usually the most harmful: since market participants have had
little opportunity to adapt to them, they create the greatest confusion and
opportunity for regulatory arbitrage. Moreover, new products provide
greater opportunities for gambling than old products do because new
products are harder to value. As market participants learn about products,
their valuations should converge; gambling takes place only when
valuations differ. Finally, the expectation of profits from new products
encourages people to overinvest in developing those products and attracts
top talent from leading universities that might otherwise go into more
socially valuable fields.150
That said, we acknowledge that many existing products may cause
more harm than good, and so we would not rule out prohibitions on
existing products. One possibility is to leave such regulation to Congress;
another is to permit the agency to impose bans on existing projects but
under a strict standard that requires the agency to make a clear showing that
an existing project is socially harmful. Thus, while our focus is prospective,
it does not preclude existing financial instruments from being regulated in
some other way.
6.

Elimination of Incentives to Innovate Because of Loss of
Intellectual Property.—The invention of the CDS required a major
intellectual and financial investment, as related by Tett.151 Investment banks
invent these products because they expect to profit from them, and they
profit by making them available to customers before competitors have
developed similar products. Once the idea becomes public, competitors can
duplicate it, driving down the price and profits. Investment banks may
therefore not engage in financial innovation if they can expect their
products to be stuck in review for a substantial period of time, during
which the details become publicly available.
This concern is exaggerated. Investment banks probably already have
excessive incentives to invest in new financial products, which, as we have
seen, have only ambiguous net social benefits. In addition, original
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financial products are potentially patentable, although the doctrine at
present is extremely murky. But if insufficient incentives turn out to be a
problem, a possible solution is to grant investment banks limited
intellectual property protection—for, say, one year—after their products
have received approval.
7. Less Burdensome Alternative Forms of Regulation.—One might
believe that less heavy-handed forms of regulation are possible, including
disclosure and labeling requirements.152 Reformers have advocated the
Tobin tax on financial transactions, which would reduce gambling by
making it less profitable.153 The new Consumer Finance Protection Bureau
is designed to protect consumers from shoddy financial practices.
Traditional capital adequacy requirements prevent banks and other
financial institutions from taking on excessive risk. The capital adequacy
requirements, which have been a familiar part of the regulatory landscape
in the United States for many decades, might seem sufficient for limiting
gambling.
We do not reject alternative forms of regulation, but we do not believe
that they are sufficient. Disclosure rules are notoriously weak;154 this
approach is clearly inadequate for pharmaceutical regulation, where people,
even with the help of their doctors, have trouble evaluating the effects of
drugs. The Tobin tax is poorly targeted; it increases the cost of beneficial
insurance as well as gambling. The CFPB addresses only a small slice of
the overall problem. And traditional capital adequacy regulation, while
necessary, has proven inadequate because it did not prevent the 2008
financial crisis. The problem with capital regulation is that banks and other
financial institutions can game the rules precisely by using the kinds of
derivatives that we would prohibit. Thus, capital adequacy regulation and
financial products regulation are complements.
8. Substitution to Unregulated Activities.—If the agency has
authority to regulate only new financial products, then investors who seek
to gamble can simply gamble on older financial products, like CDSs, which
will remain lawful under our proposal. And even if regulation reached all
financial products, then investors who seek to gamble could switch to legal
gambling in Las Vegas and Atlantic City. Thus, it may be doubted that
implementation of our proposal would have a nontrivial effect on
behavior.155
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Like the line-drawing problem, the substitution problem is a generic
objection to any form of regulation because regulators must draw lines, and
typically people can find near substitutes just on the other side of the line.
This objection rarely prevails because in practice the regulatory arbitrage is
more costly than engaging in the prohibited activity, so the regulation, at a
minimum, serves as a tax on socially costly behavior.
9. People Should Be Permitted to Gamble if They Want.—In
economic models, people are generally assumed to be risk averse. For such
people, it is not rational to gamble. Why, then, is gambling so common?
We can imagine three reasons. First, many people are simply foolish:
they believe that they can beat the odds by using tricks or relying on lucky
numbers or totems. Such people eventually lose their money and are not
made better off by gambling, whatever they might think.156 Second, some
people become addicted to gambling in the classic sense that they report
that they do not want to gamble but then gamble anyway, in the process
disrupting relationships, losing their homes, and suffering other losses.
Many people take steps to overcome their gambling addiction; in some
states, gamblers can put their names on lists that are sent to casinos, which
must then bar them from entering.157 Third, people might treat gambling as
a form of entertainment, like going to a movie, in which one pays for a
complex sensory experience that enhances one’s utility.
If these observations are correct, then gambling should be illegal, as it
is in many jurisdictions, or should be confined to settings in which it is
maximally entertaining while creating the minimum risk. This is largely
what our present system of limited and regulated casinos and lotteries
accomplishes.
But even if one agrees that people should be allowed to gamble in
casinos, it would be a serious error to conclude that they should be able to
gamble by buying and selling securities. When people gamble on
sophisticated financial instruments, they are simply misusing a device that
they probably do not understand, that generates far greater risk than
traditional gambling does, and that yields minimal entertainment value.158
Finally, we should note that most of the gambling that is engaged in by
sophisticated institutions like investment banks is probably driven by
regulatory arbitrage. This type of gambling is clearly socially harmful.
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10. Financial Activity Will Flee Abroad.—If certain financial
products are banned in the United States, they will be marketed abroad, and
American companies, including financial institutions, will be able to access
them through international transactions. This is a potentially significant
problem with our proposal, and so ultimately, the United States would need
to coordinate its policies with those of other countries where major
financial centers are located, like the U.K. However, this problem is not
unique to our proposal; it is a generic problem for financial regulation of all
types. For example, capital adequacy regulation is also subject to
international evasion, and this has given rise to the various Basel
agreements to set international capital adequacy standards. A similar
process will probably be needed for our proposal as well, but this is best
left for future research.
CONCLUSION
Any proposal to introduce new regulations will be controversial
because of legitimate concerns that regulation interferes with the efficient
allocation of resources and is vulnerable to capture by interest groups. In
the current, highly polarized political environment, it is easy to predict that
many people will regard our proposal as an excessively radical reform, one
that is inconsistent with free market traditions in the United States. It is
therefore important to emphasize that our proposal in large part revives an
old regulatory system that served the United States well until it was
overwhelmed by financial innovation in the 1990s and then dismantled.
One of our main goals is to establish a more sophisticated version of the
insurable interest rule and the common law restriction on wagering that will
block gambling while permitting socially valuable insurance. Even our
proposal for an FDA-like agency is not as radical as it sounds. Every state
has an insurance agency that possesses the power to regulate financial
instruments that have insurance-like components, as financial products
frequently do. At the federal level, the CFTC and the SEC already have
jurisdiction over financial products. For IPOs, the SEC must approve
securities in advance of the public offering, although currently its review is
limited to ensuring that disclosure requirements are satisfied.159 The CFTC
has the power to block financial innovators from selling their products on
exchanges.160 Our goal is simply to provide these and related agencies with
the right powers and guidance so that they can regulate these products
effectively.
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